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Executive Summary
2020 will be a year forever marked by the Covid-19 pandemic. The year will also be
remembered for the death of George Floyd at the hands of police officer Derek Chauvin. The
death was recorded by a bystander’s cell phone and broadcast all over the world to see. This
video proved pivotal in the prosecution and conviction of Chauvin for Floyd’s death. The video
provided powerful evidence highlighting the importance of incorporating video evidence into the
investigation and prosecution of crime.
Today, police use a variety of video evidence to assist in their investigations. In some
cases, it may be a small part of the case whereas in others it may provide vital evidence. There
has been an explosion in the number of video sources where police can now gather evidence.
Cellphone videos, private security cameras on homes or businesses, social media postings, and
police body cameras all provide possible evidence that must be collected, extracted and
analyzed. In 2019, there were 40 million professionally installed video recording systems and
224 million smartphones in the U.S. alone. Along with the approximately 400,000 body cameras
worldwide, there is a numerous amount of video available to investigators.
It is important for police departments to acquire this video evidence according to legal
requirements and best practices according to industry leaders to avoid any future legal
challenges to the evidence. This study will analyze how police departments around the country
are handling video evidence through their Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) using legal
requirements and industry best practices as a guideline. The author chose to concentrate on two
of the main legal challenges facing law enforcement today while working with digital evidence:
authentication and integrity. Despite sometimes being used interchangeably, authentication and
integrity present two different challenges when working with digital evidence. Authentication is
when the evidence put forth in a trial is what the party admitting it into evidence claims it to be.
Integrity is ensuring the evidence has not been changed or altered since its original form. In this
study, the author chose to concentrate on the issues of authentication and integrity specifically
in relation to Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME). DME is information of probative value stored
in binary form including but not limited to tape, film, magnetic, optical media, and/or the
information contained therein.
The author created a rubric utilizing best practices identified by industry leaders along
with legal guidelines set forth by the Federal Rules of Evidence, court cases, and law reviews. The
rubric evaluated the Department’s SOPs on three phases: Training, Process, and Documentation.
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INTRODUCTION

The death of George Floyd brought to public light many issues in policing today. One
problem the case shined a light on is the importance of video evidence in police investigations.
The most crucial witness in the case was the cellphone video taken by a bystander. This evidence
was pivotal in bringing charges against officer Derek Chauvin. What would have happened to the
case if the lead investigator not recover the bystander video? What if that video came from the
building’s surveillance system and was overwritten before investigating units could retrieve it?
The recovery and handling of video surveillance or digital multimedia evidence (DME) is a crucial
component of police investigations today. Without it we might have never fully understood the
George Floyd case. There was video surveillance footage, Body Worn Camera video, and In-Car
Camera video, along with the cellphone video. All of these methods of capturing an incident
were utilized by the prosecution in the case against Chauvin.
The prevalence of security camera systems across the country has exploded in recent
years. Including the number of cellphones, body cameras, and in-car cameras, most aspects of
our daily lives are being recorded by some sort form of video. Around the world, approximately
6 billion hours of video are recorded every hour (Friese, 2019). According to data presented by
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 2019 conference, in 2019 there were:
•
•
•
•
•

40 million professionally installed video recording systems in the U.S.
224 million smartphones in the U.S.
98 million network surveillance cameras in the world
29 million CCTV surveillance cameras in the world
400,000 body cameras worldwide (Friese, 2019)

In addition to all the surveillance and cellphone footage available, the Scientific Working
Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) provides additional resources that could aid in investigations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Municipal surveillance systems (downtown cameras, pole cameras)
Public Transportation
Freeway and Toll Road Cameras
Rideshare, Taxi, or private dash recording systems
Commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (drones)
Video gaming consoles
Social media platforms
News media outlet websites
Game and wildlife cameras
Cloud-based video storage solutions (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence,
2021, p. 5)

A digital forensic detective who has worked with video evidence for the past ten years
has seen first-hand the dramatic increase in available video. The detective provided the amount
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of growth in video retrieval for his agency which covers a municipal jurisdiction of approximately
100,000 residents:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2013: 331 videos, 19.76 GBs
2014: 6595 videos, 279.81 GBs
2015: 13,013 videos, 540.97 GBs
2016: 17,154 videos, 788.65 GBs
2017: 19,801 videos, 1092.47 GBs
2018: 43,870 videos, 1752.45 GBs
2019: 34,590 videos, 2474.04 GBs (Paxton, 2020)

The need for law
GBs Per Year
enforcement personnel to
utilize this evidence has also
3000
increased dramatically. All of
2500
this video is possible evidence
2000
that can be utilized to solve
1500
crimes
and
prosecute
1000
offenders. It is important to
recover this evidence and
500
ensure that the evidence is
0
being recovered in the right way
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
to verify the right person is
being charged with a crime. It is
Videos Per Year
also important to properly
handle this massive amount of 50000
evidence and ensure integrity in 40000
investigations. In discussing the
importance of digital evidence in 30000
homicide investigations, the 20000
Police Executive Research Forum 10000
(PERF) identified the challenges
0
of handling digital evidence
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
compared to traditional forms of
physical evidence such as Figure A. Growth in video retrieval for a police department covering a
fingerprints or DNA.
Digital municipal jurisdiction of 100,000 residents. (Paxton, 2020)
evidence contains a wider array
of source material, can sometimes contain personally sensitive information and requires
specialized training and equipment (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). The National
Institute of Justice (2020) further explains proper seizure of technological devices must be done
correctly due to the volatile nature of the data to preserve the integrity of the data and ensure
the evidentiary value in legal proceedings.
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Police departments will need a thorough and comprehensive network of procedures to
properly handle the challenges they face with collecting, extracting, and analyzing digital
evidence. This report will look at how departments train their members in the best practices in
handling digital multimedia evidence (DME) by evaluating their Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs). In discussing the importance of a policy and procedure manual, (Orrick, n.d.) states when
a policy and procedure manual is adequately developed and implemented, it provides staff with
information to act decisively, consistently, and legally. It also ensures department personnel are
prepared for any unusual circumstances and identifies the correct course of action.
The following definitions will be used as key terms throughout this report. The author
includes the definitions for Digital Evidence and Digital Multimedia Evidence. The author chose
to concentrate specifically on Digital Multimedia Evidence for this research but utilized sources
and materials that do not distinguish between the two.
Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME): information of probative value stored or transmitted in
binary form including, but not limited to, tape, film, magnetic and optical media, and/or the
information contained therein. (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association,
UNK, p. 4)
Digital Evidence: Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary form
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7).

Digital Video Recorders (DVR): primarily found in residential, commercial, or
governmental institutions and include these major types:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stand-Alone Embedded Digital Video Recorder
Stand-Alone Embedded Network Video Recorder
Hybrid Digital Recorder
Dedicated Computer
Personal Computer
Serve-Based (only accessible by client station)
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018)

The following definitions are provided to assist in the reading of this report. They are
taken directly from SWGDE’s Digital & Multimedia Evidence Glossary (2016, pp.4-19):
•
•
•
•

CD/DVD: Optical Disc formats designed to function as digital storage media.
Chain of Custody: The chronological documentation of the movement, location and
possession of evidence.
Copy: An accurate reproduction of information.
Data: Information in analog or digital form that can be transmitted or processed.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Data Extraction: A process that identifies and recovers information that may not be
immediately apparent.
Digital Evidence: Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary
form.
Downloading/Exporting: The process of retrieving audio, video, and still images and
transactional data from a DVR system. Can be in either the native/proprietary format
or an open format.
DVR (Digital Video Recorder): a stand-along embedded system or a computer-based
system used to record video and/or audio data.
Integrity Verification: The process of confirming that the data presented is complete
and unaltered since time of acquisition.
Media: Objects on which data can be stored.
Metadata: Data, frequently embedded within a file, that describes a file or directory,
which can include the locations where the content is stored, dates and times,
application specific information, and permissions.
Multimedia Evidence: Analog or digital media, including, but not limited to, film, tape,
magnetic and optical media, and/or the information contained therein.
Original Image: An accurate and complete replica of the primary image, irrespective
of media. For film and analog video, the primary image is the original image.
Physical Copy: An accurate reproduction of information contained on the physical
device.
Proprietary File Format: Any file format that is unique to a specific manufacturer or
product.
Triage: The process by which items considered for collection or analysis are prioritized
to determine the order in which they should be collected and/or analyzed, if at all.
Verification: 1) The process of confirming the accuracy of an item to its original. 2)
Confirmation that a tool, technique or procedure performs as expected.
Video: The electronic representation of a sequence of images, depicting either
stationary or moving scenes. It may include audio.
Video Analysis: The scientific examination, comparison, and/or evaluation of video in
legal matters.
Video Security Recording System: One of more cameras connected to a recording
device capable of storing analog or digital video information.
Work Copy: A copy or duplicate of a recording or data that can be used for subsequent
processing and/or analysis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy and public
trial, the right to an impartial jury, to confront the witnesses against the accused, and the right
to have an attorney present. While this is not a complete list of the rights guaranteed by the 6 th
Amendment, it highlights the point made by the founding fathers of a fair and impartial jury (Sixth
Amendment, n.d.). When conducting investigations, police departments should make every
attempt to ensure they are collecting and presenting evidence that abides by the principles of
the 6th Amendment. To guarantee the evidence they put forth results in every citizen receiving
a fair and impartial trial, police departments need to ensure the evidence they produce in court
is what they, in fact, say it is. Goodison et al. (2015) identified the issue of authentication and
chain of custody as one of the leading legal challenges facing law enforcement when working
with digital evidence. They define authentication as the “process of establishing that the
evidence is actually what its proponents claim it to be,” meaning the party introducing the
evidence at court is required to show the evidence is genuine. Part of the authentication process
is chain of custody, which assures the evidence was preserved in its original form (Goodison et
al., 2015, p. 11). Similarly, the terms “Integrity” and “Authentication” are sometimes
interchanged. Integrity Verification looks to answer if the evidence has been changed or altered;
Authentication seeks to answer if the evidence accurately represents what it purports to be (Law
Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association, 2010). By addressing these legal
challenges and understanding what the courts are ruling regarding digital evidence, police
departments will be better equipped to establish best practices in their policies and procedures.
Authentication and the Federal Rules of Evidence
Digital evidence that is recovered during an investigation may go through
“authentication” during trial. Authentication is “the process by which a party attempting to have
some sort of evidence admitted at trial must provide sufficient evidence so that a reasonable
juror can conclude that the evidence the party seeks to admit is what that party claims it to be”
(Rule 901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence, n.d., para. 1). In the Federal court system,
authentication of evidence is guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, several rules help provide guidance on digital evidence. One of those rules, Rule
901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence (n.d.), states the following:
(a) In General, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient enough to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.
(b) Examples. The following are examples only – not a complete list – of evidence that
satisfies the requirement:
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge
(2) Nonexpert Opinion about Handwriting
(3) Comparison by an Expert Witness of the Trier of Fact
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like
(5) Opinion About a Voice
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(6) Evidence about a Telephone Conversation
(7) Evidence about Public Records
(8) Evidence about Ancient Documents or Data Compilations
(9) Evidence about a Process or System
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule (para. 1)
Concerning digital evidence, the most important examples in Rule 901 are examples (b)(1)
and (9). Example (b)(1) states, “testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be” (Rule
901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence, n.d., para. 1). Example (b)(1) would pertain to
homeowners testifying to footage collected from their surveillance system or law enforcement
personnel testifying to digital evidence they recovered, processed, or produced in the course of
their investigation. Example (b)(9) states: “evidence describing a process or system and showing
it produces an accurate result” (Cornell Law School, n.d., para. 1). Example (b)(9) helps guide the
systems that produce digital evidence such as computers, cameras, video recorders, DVR’s, NVR’s
or other surveillance systems. Rule (b)(9) is designed for situations where the accuracy of a result
depends on the process that produces that result. In following up Rule 901, Rule 902-Evidence
that is Self-Authenticating (n.d.) states the following:
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of
authenticity in order to be admitted:
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and Certified
(3) Foreign Public Documents
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records
(5) Official Publications
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like
(8) Acknowledged Documents
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File
(para. 1)
Similar to Rule 901, there are certain sections of Rule 902 that can be applied directly to
digital evidence. 902(13) states:
A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate
result as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the
certification requirements of Rule 902 (11) and (12). The proponent of the
evidence must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902 (11) (para. 1).
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This amendment provides a procedure where authenticating specific electronic evidence
can be done without utilizing the testimony of a foundation witness. This amendment was
established to alleviate the expense and inconvenience of producing a witness to authenticate
an item of electronic evidence. Under this Rule, a proponent seeking to establish authenticity
must present a certification containing the same information that would be sufficient to establish
authenticity from information provided by a witness at trial. The new rule allows the authenticity
foundation that satisfies Rule 901(b)(9) to be established by certification instead of testimony
from a witness (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self-Authenticating, n.d.). Rule 902 (14) states: “data
copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital
identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification
requirements of Rule 902 (11) or (12)” (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self Authenticating, n.d., para.
1). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902 (11). Similar to (13), this
establishes a procedure that allows parties to authenticate data copied from an electronic device,
storage medium, or an electronic file without having to produce testimony from a foundation
witness (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self-Authenticating, n.d.). This data can be authenticated by
what is called the “hash value.”
Hash Value is a unique number that contains: “a series of letters and numbers, what some
courts have called a ‘digital fingerprint’ assigned to a particular input” (Martin, 2018, p. 3).
Because a hash value is a unique identifier produced by an algorithm, any change in a file will
change the hash value. An unedited copy of a file will have the same hash value as the original.
If a copy has a different hash value, then that copy will not be an exact replica. Rule 902(14)
allows for self-authentication from certification of a qualified person that they checked the hash
value of the proffered item and that it is identical to the original (Rule 902. Evidence that is SelfAuthenticating, n.d.). Dennis Martin’s (2018) Demystifying Hash Searches describes a “hash
search” as: “a very accurate, very computationally efficient type of search that can be used not
just for legitimate purposes but also to identify evidence of crimes outside the scope of a search
warrant” (p. 2). He further breaks down the terms “hash function” and “hash set.” A hash
function is described as “a mathematical process that takes some input, like a text file or an
image, and outputs a hash value” (p. 3). A hash set is described as “a collection of inputs that are
stored according to their hash values” (p. 3). The use of hashing and hash values can be used to
preserve evidence for trial. For example, when a copy is made of a hard drive or surveillance
video, each file generates a unique hash value. Any minor change in that file will cause a
significant difference in the hash value, therefore causing a digital chain of custody. This way,
the evidence presented at trial can be proven to be the same evidence seized initially. The
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) identifies the following as the four most
common hash algorithm families in current use: MD5, SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3 (Scientific Working
Group on Digital Evidence, 2019).
Hash values can help determine that a copy is the same as an original. When dealing with
digital evidence, the “original” is defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence 1001 (d), which states:
the “ ’original’ means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects
the information. An ‘original’ photograph includes the negative or a print from it” (Rule 1001.
Definitions That Apply to This Article, n.d. para. 1). Rule 1001 (e) defines a “duplicate” as “a
counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent
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process or technique that accurately reproduces the original” (Rule 1001, n.d. para. 1). Rule 1003
Admissibility of Duplicates (n.d.) further explains: “a duplicate is admissible to the same extent
as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or
circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate” (para. 1). In essence, the Federal Rules of
Evidence is stating there is not a single “original” when it comes to digital evidence. Anything
that is an exact copy or replica of the original is then considered an original. Therefore, by using
hash values, a copy can be introduced and proven to be the same as the “original” in trial. By
producing a hash value when acquiring digital evidence, a member will be able to check any
future copies against the original to maintain the integrity of the evidence.
FRE 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses (n.d.), may be necessary when handling digital
evidence if a member collects, extracts, or analyzes the evidence. FRE 702 states,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise if:
(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to facts of the case. (para.
1)
Authentication and the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court is the foremost authority in our legal system. The
Supreme Court has yet to decide any landmark cases dealing with the authentication of digital
evidence; however, we can look at several past decisions to help guide us. In Frye v. United States
(1923), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals came up with what is now known as the Frye
Test. In their decision, the court noted that “the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs” (Frye v. United States, 1923, para. 6). In essence, the court said a “test” without an
established place in science is between experimental and demonstrated science and therefore
not “sufficiently established.” So for a “process” or “test” to be admitted into evidence, it has to
be “sufficiently established” and accepted within the scientific community (Frye Case Brief, n.d.).
The Supreme Court articulated a similar threshold standard dealing with the admissibility of
expert evidence in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993). Daubert is the
standard by which a trial judge assesses whether an “expert witness’s scientific testimony is
based on scientifically valid reasoning that which can properly be applied to the facts at issue”
(Daubert, n.d., para.1). The Supreme Court further identified the following factors to determine
admissibility:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested
Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication
Its known or potential error rate
The existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and
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(5) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community
(Daubert, n.d., para. 2)
Authentication and Federal Appeals Court Cases
The state of Illinois falls under the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction, which means
their decisions have mandatory authority over the state and any police department within it.
Mandatory authority is any case, statute, or regulations the court must follow because it is
binding on the court. Therefore, lower courts must follow the decisions handed down by the
higher courts. Persuasive authority are any cases, statutes, regulations, or secondary sources
that a court may elect to follow but is not mandated to do so (When and How to Use Secondary
Sources and Persuasive Authority to Research and Write Legal Documents, 2004). The 7th Circuit
of Court of Appeals has yet to decide any cases dealing with video evidence; however other circuit
Court of Appeals decisions can help give guidance through their persuasive authority. The
following are additional circuits Court of Appeals cases dealing with authentication and digital
evidence:
US v. Taylor (1976)
A jury convicted Taylor and Hicks for Armed Robbery of a federally insured state bank.
On the morning of February 10th, 1975, the Havana State Bank in Florida was robbed by two men
wearing masks. The robbers ordered everyone inside into a bank vault where they were locked
inside. As the robbers fled, a bank camera was tripped, which took pictures of the robbers. Taylor
and Hicks were stopped about an hour later in Georgia but were released after two bank tellers
from the Havana State Bank could not identify them. They were re-arrested the next day by the
FBI due to the strength of the bank photographs taken at the time of the robbery. Hicks argued
in his appeal that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the contact prints made from
the bank cameras. Hicks argued the government did not lay the proper foundation for admission
because none of the eyewitnesses could testify the prints accurately represented the inside of
the bank when they were taken because they were locked in the vault. The 8 th circuit agreed
with the notion the eyewitnesses would not be able to testify to the accuracy of the prints.
However, the only testimony offered as to the foundation was the government witnesses who
were not present at the time of the incident. The government witnesses only testified to the
“manner in which the film was installed in the camera, how the camera was activated, the fact
that the film was removed immediately after the robbery, the chain of its possession, and the
fact that it was properly developed and contact prints made from it.” The 5 th Circuit found this
testimony was enough for sufficient authentication for admission of the prints (US v. Taylor,
1976).
US v. Rembert (1988)
In Rembert, the appellant Rembert was identified by eyewitnesses as well as a witness
who made an identification after viewing a series of photographs from a closed-circuit
surveillance video camera. The photographs from the eyewitness identification were entered
into evidence during the trial, with the sole authenticating witness being the supervisor of the
loss-control division of a bank. The supervisor testified how the cameras were set up, how they
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recorded, how the cameras took a picture every three seconds, and how the process imprinted
the date and time on each picture. The supervisor testified that she did not have any personal
knowledge of the events that took place but testified the photographs presented in court
accurately depict what she viewed on the original videotape. Rembert argued the photographs
were admitted under two theories of authentication, illustrative or “pictorial testimony” and the
“silent witness” model. He further argued the foundation offered by the prosecution did not
satisfy either of those two theories. The court found that he was correct in claiming the
foundation by the prosecution did not meet either of those two theories. However, they
followed the precedent set in an earlier ruling under United States v. Blackwell (1982) in that
when dealing with photographic evidence, “authentication and identification are specialized
aspects of relevancy that are necessary conditions precedent to admissibility” (para. 16). In
Blackwell, photographs of the defendant holding a firearm were seized in a search warrant. The
picture of the firearms was discovered in the same room as the recovered firearms. No witnesses
were able to testify to when, where, or by what process the photographs were made.
Additionally, there were no witnesses to testify the photographs accurately and fairly
depicted any particular scene on any specific date. A detective who conducted the search
warrant was able to testify to the detail of the pictured weapon. The detective also testified the
interior background was similar to the details of the firearm and room in question. The court
required “only that the proponent of documentary evidence make a showing sufficient to permit
a reasonable juror to find that the evidence is what its proponent claims” (para. 16). The court
also cited a previous case in the 9th Circuit, United States v. Stearns (1977) where Judge Kennedy
wrote: “Even if direct testimony as to foundation matters is absent…the contents of a photograph
itself, together with such other circumstantial or indirect evidence as bears upon the issue, may
serve to explain and authenticate a photograph sufficiently to justify its admission into evidence”
(paras. 12-21). To be consistent with their decision in Blackwell and other sister circuit courts,
the court stated: “we conclude that the contents of photographic evidence to be admitted into
evidence need not be merely illustrative, but can be admitted as evidence independent of the
testimony of any witness as to the events depicted, upon a foundation sufficient to meet the
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a)” (US v. Rembert, 1988, para. 14). The court also
noted “the role of photography in technology and society at large is a changing one, and the
courts must change with it” (US v. Rembert, 1988, para. 16). The court ruled the District Court
judgment was without error in ruling the evidence was correctly admitted and affirmed (US v.
Rembert, 1988).
US v. Munoz (2003)
In another 8th Circuit case, part of Rodriguez argues a videotape recording of his postMiranda statements was wrongly admitted into evidence by the district court. Munoz and
Rodriguez were arrested after a narcotic investigation in South Dakota. After being advised of
his Miranda Rights, Rodriguez consented to an interview when he admitted to selling and
purchasing methamphetamine. An edited version of this videotape confession was shown at the
trial. Rodriguez argued the videotape confession should not have been admitted into evidence
due to the poor quality. The 8th Circuit first noted the seven foundational requirements discussed
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in McMillan (1974) were satisfied to allow the tape into evidence. In McMillan (1974), the court
provided seven requirements for introducing evidence obtained through electronic monitoring:
1) That the recording device was capable of taping the conversation now offered
in evidence.
2) That the operator of the device was competent to operate the device
3) That the recording is authentic and correct
4) That changes, addition, or deletions have not been made in the recording
5) That the recording has been preserved in a manner that is shown to the court
6) That the speakers are identified
7) That the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without
any kind of inducement (para. 8)
These requirements having been satisfied, the court ruled, “the quality of the recording did not
call into question its trustworthiness, and because the evidence indicates that the recording was
audible and intelligible, we conclude that the district court did not abuse in admitting it into
evidence” (US v. Munoz, 2003, para. 14).
The following Federal Appeals court cases concern issues with hash values and functions.
They provide guidance on the importance and reliability of hash values.
US v. Glassgow (2012)
Robert Glassgow was convicted of receipt of child pornography after the seizure of his
computer, which contained 88 images of child pornography on his hard drive. Glassgow admitted
to investigators that he viewed the images, which he accessed through a peer-to-peer program
called “Frostwire.” After the images were downloaded, they were modified, accessed, and then
attempted to be deleted but remained on unallocated space on his hard drive. Glassgow argued
the government’s exhibit 1, a DVD compilation of three video clips from a law enforcement
database, were only “similar” to the images found on his computer. The government’s witness
testified the SHA1 values of the law enforcement videos matched the SHA1 values of the files on
Glassgow’s computer. According to the government witness, the SHA1 values matching meant
there was a 99.9999% probability that Exhibit 1 contained the same video clips found on
Glassgow’s computer. The court also defined SHA-1 as “stands for Secure Hash Algorithm Version
2- a digital fingerprint of a computer file. It is a 32-digit number that is calculated for a file and
unique to it” (para. 4). The Eighth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting their video exhibits. This case is also an excellent example of why Rule 902 (13) and
(14) were enacted. This case was settled in 2012, before 902 (13) and (14). However, in this
case, the prosecution could have produced a certified document showing the SHA1 values for
Glassgow’s files compared to the SHA1 values of the law enforcement database files. This
certified document may have alleviated the need to bring in the government witness to testify
to the match (US v. Glassgow, 2012).

12
US v. Miknevich (2011)
Miknevich argued in this case that the warrant issued for his home did not have sufficient
probable cause from the affidavit prepared by law enforcement. Investigators with the Delaware
State Police were investigating child pornography using P2P file-sharing networks. During the
investigation, a file known to law enforcement to be child pornography was discovered along
with its SHA1 hash value. From experience, investigators knew this hash value to be child
pornography. The network used by investigators returned a list of users and their IP addresses
who had this same file or a portion of it. One of those IP addresses belonged to Miknevich. Due
to these facts, a warrant was obtained to seize Miknevich’s computer. The court upheld the
District Court’s order affirming the search warrant was valid in part due to the “significance of
the SHA1 value as a ‘digital fingerprint’ and avers that the investigating officers were familiar with
the SHA1 value associated with the file on Miknevich’s computer” (para. 21). Despite the court
recognizing that computer file names do not always represent what is contained in the file, the
court found that the descriptive file name and the SHA1 value had sufficient facts for probable
cause (US v. Miknevich, 2011).
US v. Wellman (2011)
The Wellman case is another child pornography case where the validity of the search
warrant was challenged. Like Miknevich, West Virginia State Police investigators received a
spreadsheet from another local law enforcement agency that identified instances where child
pornography was transmitted over a computer file-sharing network. Although the files were not
identified by name, type, or description, as was the case in Miknevich, their hash value identified
them. The investigators received a spreadsheet that “contained a hash value for a digital file, the
Internet Protocol (IP) address of the computer offering the file for download, the locality in which
that computer operated, the time and date the file was observed, and the officer from the Task
Force who identified the file, as well as his or her law enforcement agency” (para. 2). Further
investigation revealed one IP address belonging to Wellman alleged to have hosted five different
digital files of suspected child pornography. The court ruled that the district court did not err in
denying Wellman’s motion to suppress because of the totality of the information provided in the
search warrant. The affiant in the search warrant provided his background as an investigator,
which established his experience in child pornography cases. A thorough explanation of the
technology used in the investigation and the additional effort that resulted in a six-week
investigation provided enough probable cause for the search warrant (US v. Wellman, 2011).
The following case deals with chain of custody issues that can provide guidance on the
importance of handling evidence and chain of custody.
Gallego v. United States (1960)
Gallego was a case decided in the 9th Circuit where the court looked at the issue of chain
of custody with evidence. Gallego was stopped crossing the border into the US from Mexico by
an immigration inspector and a customs inspector. The immigration inspector discovered a paper
sack containing marijuana in the trunk of Gallego’s vehicle, who then handed the sack to the
customs inspector. The customs inspector then immediately gave the paper sack to Fred
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Valenzuela, the Deputy Collector of Customs, who took the sack to his office and placed it in his
desk at the Customs House. Immediately afterward, Gallego was searched at the Customs house
where a tobacco can containing marijuana cigarettes was discovered on his person, which was
also placed in Valenzuela’s desk. Both items were in the desk for about an hour, with Valenzuela
in the vicinity the entire time. Valenzuela then put the items in a safe for the night.
The next day, Valenzuela retrieved the two items, brought them to a hearing, and
returned them to the safe after the hearing. Ten days later, the items were removed from the
safe and sent by registered mail to a customs laboratory in Los Angeles. After testing, they were
then returned by registered mail and put back in the safe, where they were kept until the day of
the trial. At trial, the immigration inspector identified the paper sack and its contents with his
initials and testified that it was the same one he had discovered in Gallego’s vehicle. He was
handed the can with his initials on it and testified it appeared to be the same can that was found
but was unable to testify the contents were the same. Valenzuela also examined both items and
testified the sack as the same one turned over to him and the can as the same one he discovered
on the appellant’s person. He further testified the contents of the can appeared to be “very
much” the same as when he discovered the can. The chemist who analyzed the two containers
testified they were the same ones that reached him by registered mail that, by his analysis, both
containers tested for marijuana. The safe where the contents were kept had a combination
where the only two individuals with the combination were Valenzuela and the acting deputy
collector of customs, who took the place of Valenzuela when he was away. Gallego challenged
the admissibility of the evidence for failing to show the government had exclusive control and
possession of the articles during the ten days they were in the safe. Gallego further argued that
it was incumbent on the government to prove that the chain of custody was complete and the
items were not tampered with or altered during the ten-day period. The 9th Circuit stated that a
physical object connected with the commission of a crime must be shown to be in “substantially
the same condition as when the crime was committed” to be admitted into evidence. The only
person allowed to make this determination is the trial judge. The jury is then allowed to disregard
the evidence if the article was not correctly identified or change in its nature. The court
determined the following factors to be considered by the judge: “the nature of the article, the
circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of
intermeddlers tampering with it. If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is
satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important aspects, he
may permit its introduction into evidence.” The court further noted the jury is then free to
disregard evidence if it finds the evidence was not adequately identified or a change in its nature.
The court also cited Pasadena Research Laboratories v. United States (1948), absence of evidence
to the contrary, “the presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties” (para. Presumption of
Regularity). They further state: “there is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce as
witnesses all person who were in a position to come into contact with the article sought to be
introduced in evidence” (para. 15). The court ruled the trial court did not err in allowing the two
items into evidence (Gallego v. United States, 1960).
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Authentication and State Cases
In the state system, the rules of evidence are guided by each states’ rules of evidence
statutes. For example, in Illinois, the rules of evidence are guided by the Illinois Rules of Evidence.
Most states model their rules of evidence after the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). In Illinois,
authentication and identification are covered in Article IX of the rules of evidence. Like the FRE,
Rule 901 is the Requirement of Authentication or Identification and Rule 902 covers SelfAuthentication (Illinois Rules of Evidence, n.d.). In Illinois, Rule 902 (12) Certified Records
Generated by an Electronic Process or System and (13) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic
Device, Storage Medium, or File are similar to FRE Rule 902 (13) and (14) (Illinois Rules of
Evidence, n.d.). Just as we can look at Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeals decisions to
provide us guidance, we can also look to the state court system to provide guidance on dealing
with authentication. In Illinois, People v. Taylor (2011) is the standard regarding video evidence.
Illinois and the People v. Taylor
In the state of Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court provided guidance on admitting video
evidence in People v. Taylor (2011). In case a hidden motion-activated surveillance camera
caught a night watchman stealing from a desk in a locked office. The camera was set up by a
detective, who then copied footage from the hard drive of the digital video recorder (DVR) to a
VHS tape. The night watchman was identified by several co-workers and subsequently
prosecuted for theft after admitting to stealing money in a police interview. During the trial, the
detective testified to setting up the camera and making sure it was in proper working order. He
also testified that he tested the equipment after the incident and found it to still be in proper
working order. The detective further explained the motion activation feature of the camera and
how the motion produced two video clips, one being twelve seconds and the other being eight
seconds. The detective testified the thirty-second gap between the two recordings was due to
the settings on the camera system that stops recording when it no longer senses motion. It was
further explained the first video clip was of the defendant entering the office and squatting in
front of the desk. The camera’s motion sensors did not pick up any motion while the defendant
was squatting down in front of the desk. The second clip caught the defendant standing back up
and exiting the room.
After being found guilty of misdemeanor theft by the trial court, the defendant filed a
motion to reconsider a new trial on the basis the State had failed to lay a proper foundation for
the admission of the VHS tape. After citing People v. Vaden (2003), where “the appellate court
noted that under the ‘silent witness’ theory, photographic or videotape evidence may be
admitted without an eyewitness to establish the accuracy of the images depicted if there is
sufficient proof of the reliability of the process that produced the photograph or videotape,” the
appellate court reversed and remanded. The Court ruled the State failed to lay a proper
foundation for admission of the VHS tape because it was unable to establish reliability of the
process that produced the tape. The State also failed to show proper chain of custody; the
camera was working correctly, the original DVR recording was preserved, and it was unable to
explain the process of copying the recording from the DVR to VHS tape. The Supreme Court
reversed under the grounds the appellate court’s reasoning was overly restrictive. The Illinois
Supreme Court held the State did, in fact, lay a proper foundation for admission of the tape. The
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Supreme Court noted most jurisdictions allow photographic and video evidence to be introduced
as substantive evidence under the “silent witness” theory. Each case will present varying
circumstances and foundation requirements for guaranteeing the genuineness of the evidence
(People v. Taylor, 2011).
If we look closer at the decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, in this case, the court
provided a lot of guidance for digital evidence. In providing analysis on the standard of review
dispute, the court offered several cases that help understand how the court views video
evidence. In Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital (1991), the court pointed out videotapes were
admissible on the same basis as photographs. In People v. Smith (1992), the court found that the
admission of photographs was at the trial court's discretion. In People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns
(2003), the court noted that videotapes could be admitted into evidence when properly
authenticated and expressly stated: “the admission of a videotape into evidence is within the
sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Addressing chain of custody in People v. Woods (2005), the court noted: “chain of custody is used
to lay a proper foundation for the admission of evidence…and a challenge to the chain of custody
is an evidentiary issue.”
In reviewing the admissibility of videotape, the court provided a definition for the “silent
witness” theory. When the photographs and videotapes are introduced as substantive evidence
under the “silent witness” theory, they do so after a proper foundation has been laid out. A
witness does not need to necessarily testify to the accuracy of a photograph or video footage as
long as the accuracy of the process that produced that material is established with the proper
foundation. In People v. Taylor (2011), the court admitted that they had not yet addressed
foundational issues for establishing the accuracy of a process that produces surveillance camera
recording evidence. They further note that other jurisdictions have set forth various relevant
factors to consider. For example, in State v. Harris (2001), the court noted three factors for laying
a foundation of authentication of photos taken by automated camera: “(1) system was reliable,
(2) system was in working order when the photo was taken, and (3) film was handled and
safeguarded properly from time it was removed from the camera until time of trial.” In
Washington v. State (2008) the court found surveillance footage and photographs produced from
surveillance equipment which was automatically operated admissible when “a witness testifies
to the type of equipment or camera used, its general reliability, the quality of the recorded
product, the process by which it was focused, or the general reliability of the entire system.”
The court understood the circumstances of each case, and the “requirements to
guarantee the genuineness of the evidence will always differ” (People v. Taylor, 2011, para. 34).
So even though the courts may set forth various factors in assessing the process that produces
surveillance footage, those factors are not necessarily exclusive foundation requirements. The
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appellate court in People v. Taylor (2011) looked at
several factors in determining whether a proper
foundation had been laid:
1) the device’s capability for recording and
general reliability
2) competency of the operator
3) proper operation of the device

PEOPLE V. TAYLOR
(2011)
Several factors in
determining whether a
proper foundation had
been laid:
1) the device’s capability
for recording and general
reliability
2) competency of the
operator
3) proper operation of
the device
4) showing the manner
in which the recording
was preserved (chain of
custody)

5)identification of the
persons, locale, or
objects depicted
6) explanation of any
copying or duplication
process (para. 35)

4) showing the manner in which the
recording was preserved (chain of custody)
5) identification of the persons, locale, or
objects depicted
6) explanation of any copying or duplication
process (para. 35)
The court agreed with the appellate court’s
factors, however as they noted with other jurisdictions,
they emphasized that the list of factors was
nonexclusive. They wanted each case evaluated on its
own, depending on the facts of the case. In some cases,
some of those factors may not be relevant; in other
cases, there may be a need to consider more factors
(People v. Taylor, 2011).
State v. Sassarini (2019) - Oregon
This case involved a confrontation between
neighbors that resulted in one neighbor recording part
of the confrontation with a video camera. The neighbor
then provided the police with a copy of the
confrontation on a DVD which contained three files the
day after the incident. The files would not play at the
police station, so the neighbor provided another copy
four days later. Sassarini filed a motion to exclude the
evidence because it could not be authenticity of the
chain of custody. During a hearing for an in limine
motion, the neighbor identified the camera and the DVD
that was booked into evidence. After the DVD was
played in court, Sassarini argued the video she received
in discovery was not the same video as the one played
in court. The court discovered Sassarini’s copy included
the in-car camera footage that the police department
had added to provide one single DVD containing all the
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video footage. The neighbor further testified that the video footage played in court was the same
footage as the original recordings on his camera. The neighbor further testified he had initially
brought the camera’s memory card to a third party to produce the copy for the police but did not
alter the footage in any way. The police officer who responded to the scene and took custody of
the DVD testified the video played in court was the same video that he observed at the neighbor’s
home. The officer also was unable to testify to what happened to the recordings between the
time he watched the footage and the time he took custody of the DVD. The court ruled the state
had presented a sufficient showing of authenticity and sent the footage to the jury. The Oregon
Court of Appeals concluded the trial court correctly admitted the video into evidence under OEC
901 with sufficient evidence to authenticate the video.
Washington v. State (2008) - Maryland
Washington got into a verbal argument with another patron at a bar. After leaving the
bar and returning, Washington asked the victim to step outside. Upon stepping outside, the
victim was immediately shot, resulting in a spinal injury. Washington was subsequently arrested.
At trial, the State introduced a videotape recording of the bar’s surveillance cameras from inside
and outside the bar. The bar owner testified to the number and placement of cameras and the
operational setup of the camera. After the police requested to see the video, the owner testified
he had a technician make a copy for the police. The officer investigating the case testified at trial
as to what he observed in the video. Two other witnesses who were in the bar testified to the
events they observed in the bar. The State did not call the technician who made the copy of the
video from the system. The Court of Appeals ruled the video was inadmissible because the State
failed to lay an adequate foundation as to the process that produced the copy of the video. The
court further stated:
Because of the lack of extrinsic evidence showing under what circumstances the
surveillance footage was transferred to a compact disc, the trier of fact could not
reasonably infer the subject matter is what the State claims it to be and, thus, the
videotape was not sufficiently authenticated. (Washington v. State, 2008, para.
19)
The State failed to authenticate the video because it was derived from an eight-camera system,
was created by an unknown person, and from an unknown process without any testimony to
how that occurred or to any chain of custody. This Court of Appeals remanded the case back to
trial court for a new trial.
State v. Nieves (2013) – New Jersey
A resident called 9-1-1 after hearing gunshots and observing an individual lying on the
ground. An officer from the Prosecutor’s Office Crime Scene Technical Services Unit met the
resident, reviewed the surveillance system, and copied footage to a disc of two people walking.
The video shows light flashes from the shooting, and then a subject walk away. Detectives then
meet with an owner of a bar where the bar’s four exterior cameras were working. A detective
viewed the footage taken during the time of the incident that the bar owner provided. The
Detective was not aware of how the footage was extracted from the system, who extracted it, or
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if any changes were made to it. A third set of recordings were recovered from another bar in the
area. The video showed the victim and defendant talking inside the bar at an unknown
date/time. The State’s expert then created a composite video utilizing the three sources of video
that had been recovered. The composite video was shown to the Grand Jury, which ended up
indicting Nieves. The Defense expert argued the videos could not be authenticated because of
the lack of the originals and lack of time stamps on the video. The judge granted the defense
motion to bar admission of the tapes because they lacked probative value and didn’t meet the
fundamental requirements of admissibility under NJRE 901. The Appellate Division of The
Superior Court agreed with the trial judge because the composite video was created from copies
from several cameras that were not correctly time-stamped. Authentication would be impossible
without an accurate timeline, without specifically eliciting a chain of custody because the
originals were not taken, and without reliable identification as to “time, place, date, individuals
and activities.”
Commonwealth v. Connolly (2017) - Massachusetts
Connolly was arrested for assault and battery stemming from an altercation in an
apartment building hallway. Connolly didn’t deny the confrontation but argued it was selfdefense. The State only produced one witness, a police officer who viewed surveillance footage
of the incident that was recorded from inside the building. Unfortunately, the video was
accidentally deleted before the defense had an opportunity to view the footage. The defense
objected to the officer's testimony about the footage, but it was allowed at trial by the judge.
The Appeals court found the State did not lay a proper foundation for authentication because it
did not present evidence to show the video's date, time, or location. Further, the State did not
call in the building manager to testify to the nature of the camera system, such as the placement
of the cameras, the type of equipment, or how he came to view the footage. Therefore, the State
did not establish a sufficient foundation for the jury to determine the video was what the officer
claimed it to be. The Court found the Commonwealth would have to establish authenticity of
the video with testimony from another individual in any retrial.
Law Reviews
Just as we look to the courts to provide guidance on how to deal with authenticating
digital evidence in the everchanging world of technology, the discussions and ideas put forth in
law reviews can also provide guidance. In Law of the Foal: Careful Steps Towards Digital
Competence in Proposed Rules 902(13) and 902(14), Facciola and Barrett (2016) discuss the
difficulty the courts have in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in modern times. The Federal
Rules of Evidence was established to provide guidance on every evidentiary problem that may
arise during a trial. However, they were initially established to deal with physical evidence such
as DNA and fingerprints. 902(13) and 902(14) were established to help the courts deal with the
virtual world of digital evidence. The Committee purposefully made 902(13) narrow to allow
authentication of electronically stored information to avoid having to call in a witness. The
committee provides an example of a photograph introduced in trial. Instead of calling in a
witness to testify to taking the picture, the phone software captures metadata of things like the
date, time, and GPS coordinates. This information is automatically generated due to a system
that produces the same results every time. A party would only need to produce certification on
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how the electronically stored information was created, transmitted, or stored to establish
authenticity. In 902(14), the Committee made the rule on the premise that every piece of
electronically stored information has a unique “hash value.” The “hash value” is a unique and
random identifier that is compared to a digital fingerprint. Checking “hash values” allows for
authentication of copies of evidence to the original to prove the evidence is what the proponent
says it is. However, Facciola and Barret are concerned that courts may not further adjust rules
to keep up with technology. They worry that the courts will accept certification and move on
without challenging the process that produced the certification. For example, a breathalyzer
produces a report that can be authenticated. However, the question of whether that process
worked correctly or produced an accurate result should evaluated (Facciola & Barret, 2016).
In their article, Authenticating Digital Evidence, Grimm et al. (2017) discuss how the new
amendments 902(13) and 903(14) will change the way the courts authenticate digital evidence.
They begin by emphasizing that authenticating digital evidence is the “same mild standard” as
traditional forms of evidence. Before understanding digital evidence authentication, they first
discuss FRE 104(a), which states: “the court must decide any preliminary question about whether
a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not
bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege” (p. 5). In essence, for most decisions about
the admissibility of evidence, either digital or not, the decision must be made by the judge alone.
The judge will be the sole decision-maker if the evidence is relevant, constitutes hearsay, is
excessively prejudicial compared to probative value, the qualification of experts, and the extent
of their opinion testimony, etc. The judge decides what evidence the jury may hear, and then it
is up to the jury to weigh the evidence as they see fit. FRE Rule 104(b) qualifies 104(a) by
providing the court with guidance on when the relevance of evidence depends on when a fact
exists that must be proved later (Grimm et al., 2017). With the new self-authentication rules in
902(13) and 902(14), the burden of authenticity questions shifts to the opponent of the evidence.
The opponent is still afforded the opportunity to challenge the certificate of authenticity, not the
burden of proof. 902(13) and 902(14) provides the proponent of the evidence a more
straightforward method to authenticate without reducing the standards for authentication. A
certification under 902(13) and 902(14) establishes only that the proffered item has satisfied the
admissibility requirements for authenticity (Grimm et al., 2017).
In recent times, some of the digital evidence being introduced at trial comes from police
body-worn cameras (BWC’s) and private citizen footage from cell phones. One of the challenges
arising in today’s climate is how do we authenticate digital evidence from these sources. In
Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, Fan (2018) discusses the
importance of pooling public and police videos in an effort to solve crime. One of the issues with
this concept is that only police videos are currently uploaded securely to the cloud, ensuring
video integrity, chain of custody, and inclusion into the official record. On the other hand, public
videos are often uploaded on the internet to places like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and other
social media outlets. According to Fan, this presents challenges in authentication. Fan identifies
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the following relevant factors from McEntyre v. State
and United States v. Munoz which help in determining
authentication of videos:
1) there have been no changes, additions,
or deletions to the recording
2) the recording was preserved in a way
that ensures its own integrity
Fan identifies the following
relevant factors from
McEntyre v. State and
United States v. Munoz
which help in determining
authentication of videos:

3) the recording is correct and authentic
4) the device used to record was capable of
capturing the relevant events
5) the person who recorded was competent
to do so
6) the recording was made in good faith

1) there have been no
changes, additions, or
deletions to the recording

2) the recording was
preserved in a way that
ensures its own integrity
3) the recording is correct
and authentic
4) the device used to
record was capable of
capturing the relevant
events

5) the person who
recorded was competent
to do so
6) the recording was made
in good faith
7) participants on the
recording are identified
(Fan, 2018, p. 6)

7) participants on the recording are
identified (Fan, 2018, p. 6)
Also discussing the importance of body
camera footage, Pike (2018) argues in her article,
When Discretion to Record Becomes Assertive: Body
Camera Footage as Hearsay, that evidence deriving
from officer’s body-worn camera should be evaluated
differently from ordinary digital evidence due to the
human element associated with body-worn cameras.
Pike argues that even computers and forensic
machines should be subject to more rigorous
admissibility standards due to human coding and thus
have a human element attached to them. She also
believes there is a case for heightened standards for
police body-worn cameras. She writes: “courts have
repeatedly held that cameras- both manually and
automatic- may be authenticated as a silent witness,
body cameras represent a unique challenge to
authentication that is distinguishable from cameras
of the past” (Pike, 2018, p. 5). Body cameras are
controlled by the officer, therefore relaying on direct
human manipulation to work. They are also meant to
provide an “officer perspective” of the incident.
Security cameras result from computer coding that
results in the camera either constantly recording or
being activated by a specific automated process such
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as motion. Body-worn cameras are triggered by a human response to human-recognized
triggering events. Pike argues that body camera footage should then be viewed as hearsay
evidence instead of demonstrative evidence (Pike, 2018). The above-listed articles identify that
not all video evidence in the trial will come from surveillance cameras. Trials may have video
evidence from surveillance cameras, body-worn cameras, or cell phone videos uploaded to social
media. As the courts have attempted to keep up with technology with rules like 902 (13) and
(14), the courts will have to continually monitor and evaluate technology and advances in video
to ensure the rules of evidence stay relevant.
Best Practices
After utilizing the court decisions at the federal and state level and law reviews discussing
current issues in digital evidence authentication, the experts can provide guidance in procedures
and policy to help law enforcement stay up to date. The National Institute of Justice provides
guidance for law enforcement when dealing with authentication of digital evidence in their
report, Digital Evidence in the Courtroom: A Guide for Law Enforcement and Prosecutors
(National Institute of Justice, 2007). The NIJ advises that key issues when dealing with
authentication deal with showing that the evidence has not undergone significant changes. This
can be done by providing chain of custody or through a witness with knowledge testimony to
show the evidence is what it claims to be. The witness with knowledge who will testify must have
personal knowledge of the facts they will testify to, but the witness “need not have been the
programmer of the computer in question, have knowledge of its maintenance and technical
operation, or have seen the data entered” (National Institute of Justice, 2007, p. 30). The NIJ
provides an example of a computer seized from a defendant. The evidence could be
authenticated by the investigating officer that seized the computer, who would show the
computer was in the defendant’s possession and the examiner who recovered the files to show
they were found on the same computer (National Institute of Justice, 2007).
In 2015, the NIJ put out another report titled: Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice
System, Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital
Evidence by Goodison et al. This report looks at current trends in digital evidence recovery, legal
issues, research, case discussion, and recommendations that help law enforcement navigate
working with digital evidence. In October of 2016, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in a
collaborative effort with the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, issued a report, Video
Evidence: A Primer for Prosecutors, acknowledged the change in video evidence in the court
room over the last ten years. The report identified challenges using video evidence in
prosecutions, the video-evidence process, and preparation tips for trial (Global Justice
Information Sharing Initiative, 2016).
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) consists of members approved
and voted in from all across law enforcement, the legal community, private industry, and
academia. Members are involved in the digital and multimedia forensic profession and makeup
six committees that develop guidance documents and three administrative committees. The
SWGDE releases documents that provide guidance, best practices, recommendations, and tech
notes. Some of the documents produced by the SWGDE that may be beneficial to law
enforcement in digital evidence include:
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-Training Guidelines for Video Analysis, Image Analysis, and Photography
-Best Practices for Data Acquisition from Digital Video Recorders
-Best Practices for Digital & Multimedia Evidence Video Acquisition from Cloud Storage
-Best Practices for Archiving Digital and Multimedia Evidence
-Best Practices for Digital Forensic Video Analysis
-Guidelines & Recommendations for Training in Digital & Multimedia Evidence
-Best Practices for Maintaining the Integrity of Imagery
By keeping updated on the most recent court decisions, legal opinions, and industry
standards, law enforcement can attempt to minimize future legal challenges to their
investigations. The above listed material provides law enforcement agencies guidance in how to
set up their policies and procedures to do that.
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METHODOLOGY

To evaluate how various departments across the country follow best practice in the field
of digital multimedia evidence (DME), the author created an evaluation rubric from multiple
sources such as the organization Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association
International (LEVA) and the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE). The author
also used best practices from other groups such as the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bureau
of Justice Administration (BJA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). The author also
relied on his professional experience working with digital evidence in his capacity as a Detective
in a large urban police department located in the Midwest. The author is currently assigned to a
technology unit tasked with provided technology support primarily in homicide investigations
and shootings, robberies, burglaries, etc. Although the author is responsible for performing many
job functions while assigned to the unit, the main emphasis is on collecting, extracting, and
analyzing DME. In his current position, the author has received some of the training listed in the
rubric and performs many of the functions and tasks listed in the rubric. Although this rubric may
not address every possible best practice suggested by professional organizations, the author
believes it covers most of them by using the premier organizations and authorities in digital
evidence as guidance.
The primary source for the rubric came from LEVA and SWGDE because they are
considered the preeminent authorities on digital evidence. LEVA was founded in 1989 and
“serves as a key resource to the global public safety community by focusing on the needs of digital
multimedia evidence disciplines by providing opportunities for professional development
through quality training and informational exchange” (Law Enforcement & Emergency Services
Video Association, n.d.). LEVA members come from all over the world and include international,
federal, state, and local law enforcement, public safety, prosecutors’ offices, and private analysis.
LEVA training consists of lecture and hands-on practical exercises that allow students to work
with equipment and tools that are widely used in the field (Law Enforcement & Emergency
Services Video Association, n.d.). LEVA also provides training that exposes students to the theory
and principles considered best practices in Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME). A student who
has completed and passed LEVA’s level 1 and 2 training courses can become a Certified Forensic
Video Technician CFVT). Students who have completed and passed LEVA’s levels 1 through 4
training can become Certified Forensic Video Analysts (CFVA). Both a CFVT and CFVA require
specialized training, but there are differences in handling digital evidence. Generally, a person
who employs a Technical Function in processing DME, such as a CFVT, will follow a step-by-step
process or procedure. A few examples of Technical Functions are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

copy digital media
convert digital media from one format to another
print images from digital media
archive data
output data to an analog or digital medium
resize digital images
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•
•

perform basic image adjustments
time reference adjustments/calibrations (Law Enforcement and Emergency
Services Video Association, UNK, p. 5)

Someone who performs Analytical Functions similar to the CFVA will require additional
skills, education, experience, and training. This training allows them to exhibit a significant
amount of judgment or opinion based on the product they produced from specific processes. A
person who performs Analytical Functions can perform the tasks listed in Technical Functions but
can also include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

image Comparison or Photographic/Video Comparison such as comparing and
contrasting known objects or persons to questioned objects or persons
conduct image aspect ratio calibration
color correction
reverse projection
photogrammetry
motion tracking
image stabilization
media alignment
audio/video alignment (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video
Association, UNK, p. 5)

SWGDE also describes different job categories of responding personnel who may come
across DME. Each job category may have a different name or responsibility from organization to
organization depending on how they are defined and their involvement in handling digital
evidence. However, SGWEDE identifies that these job categories often overlap. Training
programs should be designed specifically for the tasks to be performed but may contain several
job categories. The SWGDE job categories are:
•
•
•
•
•

First Responder: Includes personnel who are the first to secure, preserve, and/or
collect video, image, and phot0graphic evidence at a crime scene. These
personnel often have general crime scene evidence collection responsibilities.
Field Photographer/Videographer: includes personnel who document and
preserve conditions and evidence through photography or videography outside
the laboratory.
Technician: includes personnel whose primary responsibility is to collect and/or
prepare video, image, and photographic evidence for examination and analysis.
Laboratory Photographer: includes personnel whose primary responsibility is to
document and preserve evidence through photography within the laboratory
Examiner/Analyst: includes personnel for whom examination, analysis, and/or
recovery of video, image, and photographic evidence is a major component of
their routine duties. (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 6)

For this study, the author has chosen to analyze and evaluate police departments on their
best practices under the job categories and duties of the First Responder and Technician.
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Although departments may have separate job titles or defined roles for recovering DME, one
specific job title will often be responsible for other tasks that do not fall under their primary
responsibility. For example, a technician may be the First Responder while conducting their
duties and, therefore, must have a basic understanding of the primary responsibilities of the First
Responder. Vice versa, a First Responder, may find themselves being tasked to perform
Technician duties due to circumstances outside their control. Well-written policy and procedure
that provides officers with a proper, easy to follow guideline to follow best practices identified in
the policy. The author chose to evaluate under the scope of these two categories because they
most envelop the job description and duties the author encounters in his current position and,
therefore, know those categories. The author also feels well-defined standard operating
procedures can be the most useful to these two positions. They cover the broadest and general
job descriptions of handling digital multimedia evidence.
LEVA follows guidelines and best practices identified and provided by the Scientific
Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE). On its website, SWGDE identifies itself as "bringing
together organizations actively engaged in the field of digital multimedia evidence to foster
communication and cooperation as well as to ensure quality and consistency within the forensic
community” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.). SWGDE consists of six main
committees “that develop guidance documents on the sub-disciplines within digital evidence.”
These six committees are the Audio Committee, Forensic Committee, Imaging Committee,
Photography Committee, Quality Standards Committee, and the Video Committee. SWGDE’s
member organizations are a combination of public and private organizations such as various
federal, state, and local law enforcement, prosecutor’s offices, private tech firms, and even retail
stores. SWGDE’s members compose of individuals who have been approved and voted in from
all levels of government, the legal community, private industry, and academia involved in the
digital and multimedia forensic profession (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.).
In their bylaws, SWGDE states their purpose as: “to support and promote the advancement of
the application of digital and multimedia forensics through the development and dissemination
of consensus-based standards, guidelines, best practices, and recommendations. The Scientific
Working Group on Digital Evidence brings together organizations actively engaged in the field of
digital and multimedia evidence to foster communication and cooperation as well as to ensure
quality and consistency in the forensic community” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence,
n.d.). SWGDE’s objectives state they shall at a minimum:
• Define the scope and practice areas of the discipline of digital and multimedia evidence
• Recommend standard practices, protocols, reports, and terminology
• Recommend standards for data interpretation and wording of conclusions
• Recommend education, training, and continuing education requirements
• Promulgate and disseminate research and development priorities to the community
• Collect and distribute discipline-specific information on scientific foundation

26
• Seek international recognition and harmonization of appropriate SWGDE work products
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.)
Along with the recommendations and best practices provided by LEVA and SWGDE, the
author also chose to utilize best practices by agencies such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance
(BJA), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). These
reports consist of knowledge and input from law enforcement professionals from the federal,
state, and local levels and prosecutors and private sector employees similar to LEVA and SWGDE.
Utilizing these various resources and rulings from the courts and discussions brought forth
in the Law Reviews, the author has developed a rubric (See Appendix A) to evaluate how police
departments follow current best practices when dealing with their digital evidence. The main
focus of the rubric will be concentrated on how the departments’ policies and procedures
address the issue of authenticity of the evidence they handle. The author would like to identify
where these policies and procedures either follow best practice to mitigate future challenges to
authenticity or are not following best practice thereby creating an opportunity for future
challenges to the evidence.
The author chose to evaluate police departments in three pivotal phases: Training,
Methods, and Documentation. The author will evaluate how these departments' Standard
Operation Procedure's (SOPs) and policies address the best practices identified by LEVA, SWGDE,
etc., concerning these three areas. In looking at how departments prepare to handle digital
evidence in the Preparation section, four key areas were identified: Outside Training, Internal
Training, Continuing Education, and Equipment. For police departments that want to ensure
their members are following the most current and common procedures in the forensic
community, SWGDE recommends they follow the following training recommendations:
•
•
•

•
•

Define and employ a quality assurance program for the implementation of a
training program for the valid and reliable use of appropriate procedures.
Training should include only the use of validated technologies and methods.
Training should include awareness of and/or methods used for validating
technologies.
Commit to continuous learning in video, image, and photographic technologies
and stay abreast of new findings, equipment, techniques, legal developments, and
technological advances.
Implement a program for continual assessment of employees’ skills.
Pursue professional development certificates (Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence, 2016, p. 5).

SWGDE further identifies the different categories of training relevant to those individuals
who deal with digital evidence or who supervise it as the following:
•

Awareness: Training designed to provide the student with a general knowledge of
the major elements of digital and multimedia evidence (e.g., video analysis,
forensic audio, image analysis and computer forensics), including the capabilities
and limitations of hardware and software.
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•
•
•

•
•

Skills and Techniques: Training designed to provide the student with the ability to
competently use specific tools and procedures.
Knowledge of Processes: Training designed to provide the student with an
understanding of digital and multimedia evidence procedures and how to apply
that understanding given various situations and sub-disciplines.
Skills Development for Legal Proceedings:
▪ Witness Testimony: Training designed to provide the student with the
ability to present clear and non-technical digital and multimedia evidencebased testimony in court.
▪ Forensic Results Preparation: Training designed to provide the student
with the ability to prepare accurate and reliable documentation and/or
visual aids (e.g., notes, reports, printouts, audio recordings).
Continuing Education: Training designed to provide personnel with the ability to
obtain the skills and knowledge of evolving technology in digital and multimedia
evidence.
Specialized Applications and Technologies: Training in specific sub-disciplines or in
specialized areas (e.g., cell phones, image comparison, audio authentication,
video optimization) (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging
Technology, 2010, p. 5).

A digital evidence processing workshop completed in a joint effort by the Rand
Corporation and PERF found clear support among the participants in the need to train
investigators and all levels of staff, including patrol, detectives, and command staff. For example,
training on handling and preserving digital evidence "at the academy level and as part of
investigator training would promote better evidence preservation and limit seizing devices not
relevant to an investigation (Goodison et al., 2015).
The author has separated training into three distinct areas: Outside Training, Internal
Training, and Continuing Education. Outside Training would be training from outside agencies
such as LEVA, other Federal, State, and local agencies, or private companies such as tech or
software companies. SWGDE identifies this training to be beneficial in exposing officers to “new
innovations and techniques, and assist with ensuring organizations are continuing to use best
practices” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7). SWGDE further identifies
other avenues to obtain outside training to encompass “conferences, trade shows, professional
organizational memberships, professional publications, current literature, and specialized
courses or workshops” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7). "Internal
Training" is training within the department that is either available to all members or training
specifically designed for units or members that deal specifically with digital evidence. According
to SWGDE, this training provides personnel with the relevant knowledge necessary to perform
job-related tasks” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 6). SWGDE also
identifies the importance of training under an experienced and competent practitioner to gain
knowledge, experience, and improved skills (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016,
pp. 6-7). Finally, the "Continuing Education" section will evaluate how departments provide
further educational opportunities to keep up to date with the most current techniques and
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procedures. SWGDE defines Continuing Education as "training designed to provide personnel
with the ability to obtain the skills and knowledge of evolving technology in digital and
multimedia evidence” (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging Technology,
2010, p. 5). Continuing Education can also be acquired annually from sources such as
conferences, trade shows, professional organizational memberships, professional publications,
current literature, and specialized courses (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and
Imaging Technology, 2010).
The second section of Training will evaluate the equipment provided to members. This
section will look at the equipment provided to members to help perform their duties, such as
laptops, processing equipment, storage devices (USBs, DVDs), and digital cameras. SWGDE and
the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science (OSAC) lists equipment they
recommend that will assist in the acquisition of video from DVRs, such as portable computers,
USB ports, extra monitors, and keyboards (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018,
pp. 6-7) (Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 2020, pp. 29-30).

TRAINING Phase
Outside
Training

Internal Training

Continuing
Education

Equipment

Notes:
Other
Observations:
Score:
Total Score:
The next phase in the rubric will be the Process phase which will be broken into the
following sections: Preparation, Methods of Extraction, and Chain of Custody. The Preservation
section will evaluate steps taken before the actual physical extraction of evidence. Actions such
as anticipating physical and logical barriers to the evidence, ensuring access to the system,
removing bystanders, isolating the evidence from remote sources, and obtaining legal authority
to recover the evidence will help ensure evidentiary integrity and the ability to review data
(Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 2020, pp. 7-9). The author will
also evaluate if the departments identify the need to locate and preserve DME in crime scenes
or provide procedures after discovering DME in crime scenes.
In the Method of Extraction section, how departments utilize the most effective
extraction methods and steps taken to verify the integrity of the video will be analyzed. Ensuring
their members are utilizing the most current and generally accepted extraction methods will
ensure evidence satisfies any Frye or Daubert challenge. LEVA recognizes there is currently not
an extraction or acquisition standard within the industry. The lack of standard results in the
absence of a single best process for recovering DME (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services
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Video Association, UNK). However, the SOPs will be evaluated on the information they provide
their members in assisting them in this process.
Further factors to be evaluated will consist of steps taken during the extraction process
to ensure the authenticity of the evidence, such as comparing the extracted data from the
original data, verifying the correct date/time were recovered and the recovered evidence is
playable (Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 2020, pp. 8-21;
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, pp. 8-11). The author understands this may
be the most challenging phase to evaluate due to departments not wanting to publish to the
public investigative practices and procedures. The author will also be assessing if the SOPs
provide direction or guidance to its members where they would be able to find more descriptive
policies or procedures.
The final section to be evaluated
under the Process phase is Chain of Custody.
Once the evidence has been obtained, OSAC
and SWGDE advise in initiating chain of
custody according to the departments
Standard
Operating
Procedures
(Organization of Scientific Area Committees
for Forensic Science, 2020, p. 22; Scientific
Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, p.
11). Proper documentation and following
SOPs on chain of custody will keep the
authenticity and integrity of the evidence
intact and begin during the extraction phase.
The Gallego (1960) case provides guidance on
the importance of maintaining a proper chain
of custody. Like the Methods of Extraction,
the author understands that every evidence
handling procedure will be publicly available.
The author will also evaluate how
departments provide guidance on where to
find a more descriptive chain of custody
procedures. (See Figure B.)

Figure B. SWGDE Image Integrity Workflow
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PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

Notes:
Other
Observations:
Score:
Total Score:
The final phase that will be evaluated in the rubric will be the Documentation phase. This
phase will evaluate how departments document the steps taken during the Preparation and
Process phase. This section will also assess how departments document the final disposition of
the evidence, such as storage and report writing. The first section of the Documentation phase
to be evaluated will be the Field Notes section. Proper field notes will help document important
information such as location, points of contact, DVR make and model, serial numbers, date/time
offset, number of cameras, and system settings. SWGDE also recommends taking photographs
of the DVR system, cameras, and setup (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, pp.
6-7). (See Figure C.)
The next section to be evaluated
will evaluate the Final Reports produced
from both the previous phases. Most of
this information can be obtained
through proper field notes. Along with
information derived from the field
notes, proper documentation of the
chain of custody will also verify the
authenticity of the DME. This can be
accomplished by documenting when
and where the evidence was collected,
who owned the device, and had access
to it. The report should address the
chain of custody and document facts
such as who had access to the evidence,
who handled the evidence, and how it
was stored (Goodison, Davis, & Jackson,
2015).
Finally, the report should
document any further evidence that
was derived from the recovered DME.
Final reports should also document any
analytical techniques performed and
should be thorough enough to allow a
similarly trained person the ability the

Figure C. SWGDE Sample Field Note Form
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replicate the techniques and reach the same conclusion (Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence, 2018).
The final evaluation will look at the final disposition of the evidence. SWGDE identifies
the need to transfer any evidence stored on a temporary storage device to a permanent storage
device (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018). It is best practice to have a policy
that defines what data is to be archived and how long it will be retained. There should also be a
system to identify how the department will store the evidence, such as using optical media or
external hard drives. According to SWGDE (2020, p.5):
Management of a digital evidence archive is an active, ongoing process involving
a set of policies, practices, procedures and tools that collectively ensure archived
information is preserved, safeguarded and remains accessible and usable for its
entire lifecycle, from acquisition to final disposition.
The author understands the policy of storing and accessing evidence typically is under the
job duties of an “evidence section,” the author is looking for basic procedures in the SOPs such
as storage options and documentation of storage along with evidence procedures.
DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

Notes:
Other
Observations
Score:
Total Score:
Data Analysis
The author will compare the different departments' results to evaluate where they
measure in relation to the best practices identified by the above-mentioned organizations. The
author chose to utilize a Likert scale from 1-5 to score how the departments' SOPs compare to
best practices, with (1) being below average to (5) being above average. Having a continuum of
responses, Likert-type scales assume the responses are linear and can be measured (McLeod,
2019). In this study, the author will score the evaluations by how above or below average the
department’s SOPs compare to the identified best practices.
1
Below Average

2
Slightly Below
Average

Scoring Table
3
Average

4
Slightly Above
Average

5
Above Average
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Overview of the Sample
The author utilized both purposive and convenience sampling to gather data for this
analysis. The author utilized web searches on the internet to obtain various police department
manuals, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or policies. The web searches allowed the
author to access the most easily accessible policies saving time and effort (Gray, 2014). The
primary web source utilized in acquiring this information came from a webpage titled “Police
Manuals” (Ciaramella, n.d.). This website contains various policies and procedures from 38 police
departments across the country. Most entries have a hyperlink next to the city's name that redirects the user to a department’s website with their policies and procedures. A Google search
for “police department policy and procedures” or “police department manuals” will return a
listing for the “Police Manuals” website utilized in this report. All policies and procedures used
in this report were open to the public. The author also utilized purposeful sampling to locate
manuals that contained varying levels of thoroughness concerning DME in their policies. Gray
(2014) identifies using purposive sampling when settings are chosen because they are known to
provide important information. In choosing samples that varied in DME content, the author’s
goal was to identify disparity among police departments from their DME policy.
Six total departments were chosen based on their policy and procedures concerning
Digital Evidence. 2 departments were selected to exhibit a Below Average level of thoroughness,
2 showed an Average level of thoroughness, and 2 revealed an Above Average level of
thoroughness. The departments came from all over the country and vary in size of department
members and size of the population they serve. All departments evaluated in this report had
policies and procedures that were open to the public and accessible on the internet and through
the “Police Manuals” website. The following departments were utilized in this study:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Department A: a large urban department in the Mid-Atlantic region
Department B: a large urban department in the Northeast
Department C: a medium urban department located in the West
Department D: a medium to large urban department located in the Southwest
Department E: a large urban department located in the Northwest
Department F: a large urban department located in the Southeast

Limitations
One of the limitations of this study is the small sample size. The author only chose to
evaluate six departments from across the country, which does not accurately reflect every
department throughout the country. There are numerous factors to consider when evaluating
departments, such as the number of officers, size of the population it serves, size of the
geographical area it covers, geographical location of the department, and many others that may
be taken into consideration. A large, urban police department in the northeast may not operate
the same way as a small, rural department in the southwest. Departments will have varying
levels of resources available to them, affecting the staffing and equipment they can designate for
items such as DME.
Also, there are different types of departments such as municipal
departments, sheriff’s offices, state patrol or investigative agencies, and federal law
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enforcement. This report does not account for differences among the various law enforcement
agencies throughout the United States.
Another limitation in this study only evaluated open source policies and procedures that
could be accessed through the internet. This allowed for convenience but did not result in a full
and thorough evaluation of all policies, procedures, training bulletins, guidelines, or material
available to the various members of the departments. Materials not open to the author may be
more thorough and precise concerning digital evidence within the departments. The author also
understands the need for departments to keep some policy and procedure accessible to only
department members. While the lack of access to some materials may have hindered some of
the research conducted in this study, the author utilized this opportunity to evaluate the
accessibility of SOPs. A police officer who may find themselves in the middle of a crime scene
with potential DME should have the ability to access SOPs regarding DME while on scene easily.
This will help the officer follow best practices or give the officer the information to contact
someone to provide guidance. A more thorough examination of all materials pertaining to policy,
procedure, and digital evidence may have produced a different result.
A final limitation of this study was the subjective nature of the evaluation by the author.
The author did not utilize a published or industry standard for evaluating the departments and
their policies concerning Digital Evidence/DME. The author’s evaluation method was based on
the author’s interpretation of based practices identified by industry leaders and the author's
personal experiences handling Digital Evidence/DME. The findings in this report are the author's
interpretations and evaluations of the policies and procedures. Due to the small sample size, not
having access to all available materials, and the author's subjective review, this report lacks
external validity and should not be generalized to all departments.
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RESULTS

In looking at police department policies and procedures or Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), the author began by looking for sections designated explicitly for Digital
Multimedia Evidence or Video Evidence. If the author could not find specific DME SOPs or related
SOPs, the author expanded the search to include anything Digital Evidence related. If there were
no resources associated with Digital Evidence, the author then researched other SOPs involving
evidence handling, forensics, crime scene duties, or follow-up procedures. Frequently when
there were no stand-alone DME or Digital Evidence SOP, DME or Digital Evidence information
could be found in one or some of these other SOPs.
Above Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs
Having a stand-alone SOP on Digital Evidence provides easy access for department
members to find information about Digital Evidence. Department A and Department B both had
stand-alone SOPs specific to digital evidence. Department A has a Special Order titled “Digital
Video Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) Kits,” S.O. XX-XX, while Department B has a “Digital Evidence”
SOP listed under Directive X.XX. Both orders are
specific to Digital Evidence and specifically to
Digital Multimedia Evidence. Department A also
has a special order titled “Requesting Video
Evidence” S.O. XX-XX, but the order focuses
more on requesting video footage from their
CCTV system but still may provide some
crossover with the DIVRT order.
Department A
Department A has many similarities to
Department B when it comes to Digital Evidence
SOPs. Department B has provided certain
members of their department with Digital Video
Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) Kits and has an SOP
specifically for using those kits. Although there
is beneficial information in the SOP, most of the
information concerning Digital Evidence has to
be gathered from other SOPs in their directives
system. For example, they have separate SOPs
specifically for Outside Training and In-Service
training. The SOPs provide procedures for
requesting training, procedures for records
Figure D. Department A Equipment List
keeping after training, and duties for
supervisors when outside training is requested.
The outside training SOP also provides documents to request training as an attachment and
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instructions for their members. The internal training SOP also provides procedures for requesting
training, procedures for developing training, supervisor duties, and identifies mandatory 40-hour
training yearly for sworn department members. The internal training SOP does not include any
forms for actions such as requesting training or developing training. The training SOPs and the
DIVRT SOP do not address Digital Evidence training specifically, which may be addressed in other
directives that are not open source. Department is the only department evaluated for this report
that had an SOP specifically for equipment related to Digital Evidence. The DIVRT SOP contains
an inventory form as an attachment that lists all equipment associated with the kit. This
equipment inventory list includes the cases, cables and connectors, USBs and DVD/CDs, a
camera, flashlight, laptop, a LawMate Personal Video Recorder (PVR), and guide books. (See
Figure D.)
Few preparation steps were dealing with digital evidence within the department’s SOPs.
The preparation steps in the DIVRT SOP identified steps in making sure the DIVRT kits were
functional and operational before digital evidence retrieval. All other SOPs dealing with crime
scene response, evidence collection, and criminal investigation provided general procedures with
nothing specific to DME. When it comes to extracting DME, there is generic information in the
DIVRT SOP, such as filling out forms and uploading recovered evidence. The retrieval
documentation form does identify important information from the system that should be
addressed during extraction: DVR make
and model, number of cameras, and DVR
offset.
Similarly, when it comes to
managing Chain of Custody, the DIVRT SOP
does not contain specific sections
concerning Chain of Custody. Still, the
retrieval documentation form contains an
entire
“Audit
Trail”
section
for
documentation. The author was able to
locate other SOPs detail the proper
collection and handling of evidence that
included a “general property record” form
to document chain of custody.
Department
A provides
its
members with a retrieval documentation
form that is ideal for use as field notes. (See
Figure E.) The form is a very descriptive 4page document that includes all the
relevant information needed in digital
multimedia evidence recovery: make,
model, serial number, date/time offset,
number of cameras, passwords, etc. The
DIVRT SOP does not detail procedures for
final reporting, but there are other SOPs
within the directives that detail procedures

Figure E. Department A Documentation Form
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for final documentation. These SOP’s define procedures for documenting the uploading of video
or who is responsible for final case files; however, they do not specifically mention procedures
for final reporting on DME. Similar to final reporting SOPs, the DIVRT SOP identifies for its
members related general evidence SOPs for proper inventorying procedures. These are general
SOPs and do not contain specific information about digital evidence. Department A’s numerous
SOPs accessible to the public are very detailed; however, the author found that some were very
outdated. There seemed to be a lot of information across numerous SOPs. It would be helpful to
have more of the various details on digital evidence in one SOP.
Department B
Department B Directive X.XX scored very well in most sections of the Rubric created by
the author. Department B had the most extensive training information in their SOP with a
dedicated section titled “Required and Accepted Training” within Directive X.XX. The training
section lists approved outside agencies for training in Digital Evidence and identified training that
might come from interdepartmental sources. Although the directive does not list actual training
courses, the directive specifies the need for training. It outlines the responsibility for Department
B’s Office of Forensic Science to keep up with industry standards and best practices. When it
comes to the Equipment section, Department B was average in relation to the other
departments. Directive X.XX didn’t specifically itemize equipment available to members but did
notate within the order, “All ‘Department B’ issued tools and equipment have been removed and
collected.” The directive advises “personnel that they will not exceed the scope of their training
(i.e., DIVRT training covers the extraction of video from DVRs, not cell phones),” which tells the
author that Department B personnel have access to equipment.
Department B Directive X.XX was very advanced compared to the other departments in
relation to the Process section of the evaluation. Department B once again had a section titled
“Preparing to Recover Digital Evidence.” The directive identifies the need for personnel to obtain
permission to access the device or have legal authority before recovering digital evidence. A “DE
Recovery Form” (xx-xxx) and a “Recovery Log” (xx-xxx) are identified in the preparation section
of X.XX. Throughout the entire directive, Department B identifies the need to canvas for digital
evidence, the procedure for notifying the correct responding personnel, and who is authorized
to recover digital evidence. When it comes to the extraction process in Directive X.XX, the
directive also has a section titled “Recovery of Digital Evidence.” Although most of this section
appeared to the author to be more in line with computer-related evidence, the directive provides
other valuable procedures such as photographing equipment before recovering, moving, or
disturbing electronic devices. Department B identifies the need to follow the most current SOPs
when recovering evidence due to the rapidly changing and evolving pace of technology.
Department B also identifies the need to recover evidence in their “native, unaltered format”
and document all procedures and actions taken when that is not possible. The directive then
identifies procedures for requesting forensic examinations and the responsibilities of those
conducting forensic examinations. Department does a nice job of addressing Chain of Custody
issues with digital evidence. All digital evidence is stored in their Digital Evidence Management
System (DEMS), described as a virtual evidence room. It is a secure location for digital evidence
with only authorized access. All user actions are logged and audited; all evidence has an audit
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trail as well as receiving a hash value upon entry into the system. According to the directive, all
data will be stored redundantly in case of a catastrophic system failure. The directive refers to
“the most current SOPs for complete user information on DEMS” but did not give a directive/SOP
number or a hyperlink to the SOP; therefore, the author could not access it.
Directive X.XX provides personnel
with two Digital Evidence Recovery
Forms, Form xx-xxx-Digital Evidence
Recovery Form and Form xx-xxx-Digital
Evidence Recovery Form (Digital Video).
(See Figure F.) Form xx-xxx is the more
generic form used on all digital evidence,
while Form xx-xxx is more specific to
Digital Multimedia Evidence. Form xx-xxx
covers many of the vital information
needed to recover Digital Evidence, such
as make, model, serial number,
username/password, DVR offset, number
of cameras, and retention time. Along
with providing the forms, the directive
also provides instructions within the SOP
on what information should be filled out
by recovering personnel. The directive
does not address final reporting
procedures;
however,
with
the
information obtained in the field notes
and recovery forms, most of the pertinent
Figure F. Department B Retrieval Form
information needed for a final report will
be easily accessible from these forms. Finally,
along with the chain of custody information
provided throughout the directive, there is a section titled “Retention and Purging.” This section
assigns evidence disposition responsibilities to a “Digital Evidence Custodian” who will safeguard
and manage “digital evidence created, collected, or otherwise utilized by the XXXXXX Police
Department.” The section also identifies the need to conduct periodic audits and reviews of their
DEMS system to ensure digital evidence is submitted, stored, and purged responsibly.
Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs
Department C
In the previous two departments, we have seen strong examples of having well-written
SOPs addressing Digital Multimedia Evidence. The following two departments demonstrate
average SOPs where they are above average in some areas and below average in other areas.
Department C has a specific digital evidence order titled “Recovering Digital Media Evidence.”
This SOP touches upon a few of the essential topics related to digital multimedia evidence but is
not as detailed as the previously analyzed departments. The order does not contain a training
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section or define any training specific to digital evidence. The department does have a training
SOP that contains standard training information. It defines inside and outside training,
responsibilities for members seeking training, and responsibilities for training personnel. The
SOP identifies forms to be filled out for actions such as requesting training. However, it does not
provide an example of the form within the SOP or a hyperlink to the form. Regarding identifying
equipment for digital evidence, the digital media evidence SOP does not have anything specific
to digital evidence. The SOP identifies members from a criminal analysis unit to convert
recovered video in a playable format that would require some equipment but does not explicitly
mention which or what type of equipment.
In evaluating Department C’s SOPs to the Process phase of the rubric, Department C’s
SOPs contain general procedures with few pertaining specifically to DME. In identifying
preparation steps for recovering digital evidence, the digital media evidence SOP outlines the
need for an investigator to accompany recovering personnel to the location of recovery. The
investigator is also responsible for providing the date, time, and location of digital media
evidence. The SOP also identifies the need for recovery personnel to recover digital media
evidence in accordance with their training and best practices but does not provide any more
information. The department has other SOPs that cover general crime scene and investigator
responsibilities, chain of custody, and evidence handling procedures, but these SOPs do not
contain information or policies specific to DME. According to the digital media evidence SOP, the
Crime Analysis Unit is responsible for recovering digital evidence. Still, the author could not locate
any SOPs pertaining to this unit in Department C’s policy system. From the information provided
from the various SOPs, the author could not find any procedure information concerning the
extraction or chain of custody of DME.
When it comes to documenting field notes and final reporting, Department C’s SOPs
provide general information and do not provide a lot of detail. For example, the SOP identifies a
recovery request form and a digital evidence recovery form but does not provide a copy as an
attachment or a hyperlink. The author was unable to view these forms to evaluate their content.
The SOP also identifies the need to document the recovery of digital evidence in police reports
but does not provide specifics such as a format, required content, responsible personnel, etc.
The SOP also identifies another specific SOP for a forensic report for computers and other digital
evidence. Still, the link to view the SOP within the policy system was inactive. According to the
digital media evidence SOP, the final disposition of evidence procedures can be found in a
separate SOP which covers general evidence handling procedures. The forms identified in the
digital evidence SOP may be comprehensive and contain good information that will allow
recovery personnel to document the recovery in a very detailed manner. For having an entire
SOP specific to digital multimedia evidence, the author felt it was too generic and not specific
enough to DME.
Department D
Department D does not have an SOP specific to digital evidence or DME from what was
available to the general public in their online policies and procedures webpage. An SOP that
contained digital evidence information can be found in their SOP titled “Crime Scene Duties.”
Although it would be easier to have a stand-alone SOP specific to digital evidence, the SOP does
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have specific sections related to the recovery of digital evidence. Similar to other departments,
Department D has a separate SOP that covers all training within the department. Besides the
initial training to be a licensed law enforcement member, Department D also identifies in-service
training, roll-call training, specialized training, and career development. Most training is provided
within the department but does allow for officers to seek training outside the department when
it is beneficial to the member and not available through Department D. Department D has a
Training Academy Online web portal, along with a Career Development Program through the
portal which was restricted to members of the department. The author was unable to locate any
information specific to training and equipment within the SOPs. The online training academy and
Career Development Program may provide much more information to members that are not
accessible to the public.
The Crime Scene Duties SOP contains two specific sections covering digital evidence:
“Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings Are Made” and “Preservation of Digital Evidence.” The
“Preservation of Digital Evidence” section is more associated with recovering computers and
computer-related equipment. Still, it does provide some reasonable preparation steps for dealing
with all digital evidence, including digital multimedia evidence. The measures include having tech
personnel on scene prior to executing a search warrant, guidelines for when officers first
encounter digital storage devices, and documenting all actions taken when members manipulate
devices. The “Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings Are Made” section provides some
preparation steps before extracting evidence, such as contacting whoever is in charge of
recording location and notifying a supervisor when denied access. The SOP offers very little
information about the extraction process of digital evidence and reminds officers to maintain
chain of custody when recovering video recordings. The latest update to the SOP was in 2014,
but the author noticed the SOP repeatedly referred to VHS tapes throughout the SOP.
The Crime Scene Duties SOP lists referenced documentation forms but does not provide
examples or hyperlinks. All other processes for documentation are generic and do not specifically
mention DME. The only information the author was able to locate concerning documentation
and digital evidence was in an SOP about digital photography. This SOP dealt with Department
D’s members documenting physical evidence or observable crime scene detail with the
department's equipment. The SOP had some practical procedures for digital multimedia
evidence such as documenting name and badge number of the person producing the evidence,
the date and time it was put onto a storage device and distinguishing between the “master” copy
and copies. However, this SOP was strictly related to Department D self-documenting crime
scenes or other important circumstances of a case and not directly with digital evidence. Finally,
when detailing the final disposition of evidence, the crime scene duty SOP describes the
procedure for delivering master video recordings along with reports to a specific location within
the headquarters building. For any other information concerning evidence handling, Department
D members can look to other SOPs that supply generic evidence handling procedures but nothing
specific to digital evidence. Department D did create a section within their crime scene duty SOP
to provide information on recovering and handling digital evidence. Still, the information
contained within the SOP was not very thorough. The SOP could use updating with its vocabulary,
procedures, and documentation to be more effective.
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Below Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs
Department E
The last group of departments evaluated did not have any specific digital evidence SOPs
or digital evidence sections within other SOPs similar to Department D’s crime scene duty SOP.
Department E did not have any specific SOPs or sections within an SOP that dealt directly with
digital evidence. The author evaluated various SOPs within Department E’s policy system for any
SOPs that might contain any information concerning digital evidence. The author began by
evaluating Department E’s training SOP to check for any information that may be useful to
training and digital evidence or DME. Department E’s training SOP contained generic training
information with nothing specific to digital evidence. The training SOP was similar to the other
departments’ SOPs, with general information provided about outside training, internal training,
and continuing education. In looking at Department E’s directive system, the author could not
find any information that identified equipment in relation to digital evidence. There was one SOP
within their system related to equipment, but the SOP was more specific to returning
department-issued equipment upon separation from the department.
Continuing to look within Department E’s SOP system, the author was also unable to find
anything specific to digital evidence and the Process phase of the rubric. Since there was no SOPs
specific to digital evidence, the author searched other SOPs such as crime scene investigation
and homicide/investigation units for information that may be relevant to the process of handling
digital evidence. Those SOPs identified steps for conducting investigations and procedures to
follow were nothing concerning preparing, extraction, or handling digital evidence. The
department had very detailed evidence handling SOP that provided procedures for maintaining
chain of custody but did not include anything relative to digital evidence in the SOP.
While looking through the other SOPs within Department E’s system, the author found
various forms identified within those SOPs that are to be used by members when documenting
investigations. These forms included basic incident reports to a summary of investigation
reports. The author was unable to locate the content of these forms through the SOP system, a
hyperlink was not included, and the forms were not provided as an attachment to the SOP. The
author was able to find one mention of DME in an SOP detailing homicide investigation
procedure. In that SOP, members were advised which items of the investigation file should be
included. This identified items such as lab reports, interviews, crime scene sketches, autopsy
reports, and “digital media.” A definition of “digital media” was not provided, and the author
was unable to locate any other sections within the SOP that mentioned “digital media.” Just as
in the chain of custody section, the author found very detailed SOPs concerning evidence
handling and disposition, but nothing that specific to digital evidence.
The author found one SOP that had a promising title but was quick to find out that it did
not provide the information relevant to this report. The SOP was about the department’s video
center, which is the city and department’s CCTV system in public areas. This is the city and
department run CCTV program and all the information provided was procedure in handling the
CCTV system with no information about third-party digital evidence. The department also has
an 11-page SOP for cybercrime. This SOP provides excellent information with the investigation,
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recovery, handling, and storage of computer equipment. This SOP provides a lot of the
information being sought for digital multimedia evidence acquisition but is almost entirely about
computer-related equipment and does not provide information on video-related computer
equipment such as DVRs. It would be easy for Department E to add information pertaining to
DME to this SOP.
Department F
The evaluation of the final department’s manual produced one SOP about photo
evidence. The SOP states the policy applies to the creation and preservation of photographic
evidence but does not define photographic evidence. From evaluating the SOP, the author felt
the SOP was defining procedure for taking and handling photographs produced by department
members. The beginning of the SOP states the policy addresses when members obtain digital
photographic and video evidence from a third party; however, the information provided is highly
minimal.
The only training brought up in the photo evidence SOP is the training employees will
receive on Digital Single-lens Reflex (DLSR) camera systems and investigative photography
techniques. Although this training may provide some beneficial information regarding digital
evidence, this training appears to be designed to train members in the use of DSLR cameras to
document crime scenes and evidence. The author looked at other training SOPs within the
system, which provided information on external and internal training and continuing education.
The author could not locate any training specific to the recovery or handling of digital evidence
within the department’s policies. For equipment provided to members to help with digital
evidence, the photo evidence SOP identifies the DSLR cameras and smartphones, “departmentsupplied devices,” and media cards. The SOP does not identify or further describe the
department-supplied devices but states employees will use them to capture photographic
evidence. Members are also provided with imaging processing software to help document crime
scenes, but the SOPs do not identify the software.
When it comes to preparing for digital evidence, there is nothing in the department’s
SOPs to guide their members in preparation for digital evidence. There is also nothing in the
SOPs when it comes to extracting or obtaining digital evidence. In the photo evidence SOP, there
is a section for dealing with the collection of third-party photographs. However, this section only
identifies that these photos can be uploaded to the Digital Evidence Management System (DEMS)
and provides procedures for doing that. The photo evidence SOP does not address the issue of
chain of custody when dealing with digital evidence. The author looked to evidence procedures
within the department system and found the department’s SOPs provide a link to the state patrol
forensics services guide for proper evidence collection procedures. The state patrol guide
provided detailed chain of custody procedures but nothing specific to digital evidence.
The photo evidence SOP does not provide any information in the documentation of photo
evidence or procedures for final reporting on the evidence. The only form mentioned in the SOP
was a photo media envelope used when submitting evidence from a media card when the DEMS
system is not functioning. Looking through the SOPs for final reporting procedures revealed
procedure stating case files must follow standards set forth by the States Attorney office with
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nothing specific to digital evidence. The photo evidence SWOP primarily contains procedures for
how members upload or enter their photo evidence in either their DEMS system, a DEMS web
kiosk, or a third-party storage provider. The entire SOP primarily refers to photos or photographic
evidence and does not mention video or and other digital multimedia evidence.
Further, the state patrol forensic services guide provides evidence submission and general
guidelines for collecting, preserving, and packaging physical evidence. Still, it does not offer any
specific procedure for digital evidence. The author was also able to find a state patrol “high tech
crimes unit” section within the forensic services guide. Still, the unit only assisted departments
with support and training in cell phones, computers, cameras, SD cards, and other digital storage
devices. This unit within the state or other units with the department could provide digital
evidence support, but the author was unable to find anything in the materials available online.
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DISCUSSION

This report aimed to identify best practices for handling digital multimedia evidence using
federal and state rules of evidence, legal opinions, and industry leaders as a guideline. By
comparing the best practices established by industry leaders with the guidelines put forth by the
courts and legal opinions, the author will utilize the data from the evaluations to come up with
recommendations. These recommendations will concentrate on best practices within police
departments when creating SOPs for digital multimedia evidence. The author purposefully chose
SOPs with varying degrees of thoroughness in their procedures for digital evidence to develop
areas where SOPs need improvement and areas where SOPs are strong and can be used as an
example for other departments. By having solid SOPs that comply with industry best practices,
current legal requirements will allow departments to conduct better investigations, minimize
court challenges, and stay up to date with technology that is constantly changing.
Digital Multimedia Evidence – Training
Evaluating the training procedures outlined in the department’s SOPs, which are
accessible to the public, was challenging. Understandably, departments may not list all training
requirements, topics, or methods in general SOPs. Specific training material may be kept within
a training unit. For example, DME training may be located in the Forensics Unit or in another unit
responsible for handling digital multimedia evidence. In evaluating the six departments,
Department A and Department B both included a fair amount of information about training in
either their DME-specific SOP or general training SOP. Department B listed for their members
outside agencies that the department approves for DME training. Department A has SOPs
explicitly designated for outside training and internal training that provide information. The
Department A outside training SOP even included forms for requesting outside training in the
SOP. Department A and Department B both identified the need to continue education by stating
the need to keep up with technological changes and stating the number of yearly training hours
members are to receive. The department’s commitment to putting these training requirements
and information in writing shows they understand the importance of utilizing best practices
identified by SWGDE.
Departments need to ensure their members are using validated technologies and
methods and have an understanding of any new findings, equipment, techniques, and legal
developments (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016). By having the training
information listed in general training SOPs or the DME SOP, every member in the department
can find information that may help them obtain the training needed to handle DME. As
Goodison, Davis, and Jackson (2015) discovered in their workshop, all levels of staff need to be
trained in DME. Good training information within either a DME-specific or training SOP will help
provide all members the information needed to acquire such training. The other departments
all had similar training SOPs that provided training information such as methods for requesting
additional training, forms for requesting training, yearly training hours required, and even online
training academy portals. These departments did not provide any training guidelines specific to
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DME, so they were given a lower evaluation. However, if the author had more access to the
training materials and SOPs, the departments' evaluations might be rated higher.
Training is significant in handling DME because the member handling the evidence may
be called on to authenticate the evidence at some point during legal proceedings. The methods
and techniques utilized by the member must be able to pass a Frye or Daubert challenge.
Showing the court the training received by the member provided the member with up-to-date
methods and techniques will help satisfy any Frye or Daubert challenge. In Munoz, one of the
seven requirements for introducing evidence was the fact the operator was competent in the
operation of the device. The court in People v. Taylor provided a similar requirement by looking
at the operator's competency in deciding factors for a proper foundation. Training according to
best practices in the operation of recording devices will show the members competency in
handling the device and the evidence it produces. Further, the member may be called to trial
to provide testimony as an expert witness under FRE 702. Proper training is the first step that
will allow the member to prove they are qualified by their knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education (Cornell Law School, n.d.).
Just as training is essential to show the member is utilizing current best practices and
techniques, the proper equipment utilized by the member is a critical component of handling
digital evidence. Like training, it is understandable that departments might not list all equipment
available to members in SOPs accessible to the public. Equipment may be further defined and
detailed in unit-specific SOPs. Looking at the evaluations of the departments, some of the SOPs
still provide helpful information that departments should utilize. Department A provides trained
members with the Digital Video Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) kits and an inventory form with all
equipment in the kit listed. This allows members to easily use a “grab n go” kit containing all the
necessary equipment needed to handle DME. Along with an inventory checklist where members
can visually confirm the equipment, the members will be fully equipped to handle DME in the
field.
While analyzing the other departments’ SOPs, the author was able to identify other
equipment available to those departments’ members that is beneficial in DME. Items such as
stand-alone laptops and digital cameras to document crime scenes can be highly beneficial when
working with DME. Laptops with admin privileges allow members the ability to download
propriety software to play videos. Digital cameras allow members to document the area where
the video systems are located, the video system, and any identifying markings, date/time offset,
and the display screen with the number of cameras and camera views. From personal
experience, documenting these factors is very important. It allows a member the ability to check
information such as date/time offset and camera view to make sure the evidence recovered is
what was being sought after. Taking pictures allows the member, along with good field notes, to
make sure the evidence they are acquiring is what they say it is to avoid any authentication
challenges.
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Digital Multimedia Evidence – Process
The Process phase begins with evaluating the preparation taken before the actual
recovery of the evidence. It is essential to prepare to handle evidence by understanding what
evidence is being sought, where the evidence is located, legal authority, and the timeframe to be
recovered. SWGDE identified the need to obtain proper legal authority before seizing or
acquiring video evidence and specifically mentions referring to organizational policy regarding
requirements for obtaining authority (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018).
Department B had an entire section within their digital evidence SOP directed at the preparation
of digital evidence. It outlined the importance of identifying legal authority, evaluating the
system, and determining the data to be recovered. Department C’s SOP also identified the need
for members to be provided the date, time, and recovery location. Proper preparation and
understanding of what is to be recovered will provide the member with the information needed
to ensure they minimize authentication issues in the future.
Other steps for preparation identified in the SO’s that were not specific to digital evidence
were the need to properly canvas crime scenes for evidence. Expressly, members should be
advised in their SOPs the need to identify DME similar to the way they are trained to identify
other forms of evidence such as fingerprints or DNA when responding to crime scenes. SWGDE
recognized the importance of determining the physical location of the recording device, the
date(s) and time(s) of interest, and any expected storage media needs before any acquisition
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018) (Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence, 2021). By identifying locations of DME along with the necessary information about the
location of the DME such as owner, availability for access, system info will provide responding
personnel responsible for recovering the evidence the information needed to perform their
duties. SWGDE (2021) also recommends being proactive by contacting businesses and citizens
in high-volume call areas to build community relationships to expedite video recovery. In most
of the SOPs detailing crime scene duties, the author observed that the SOPs did not specifically
identify DME when looking for or protecting evidence in a crime scene.
The extraction phase of recovering DME is the first time members begin handling the
evidence. The departments did not have very descriptive extraction procedures listed in their
SOPs. Department A and Department B provided the best procedure by identifying the need to
photograph the equipment, providing documentation forms to fill out during the extraction
process, and identifying the need to extract the evidence using best practices and in the native
format when possible. LEVA (n.d.) recognizes the need for SOPs to be sufficiently detailed but
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not be so rigid that members are not
allowed any flexibility. As we have seen
from court cases such as People v. Taylor
(proper operation of the device,
explanation of the copying or duplication
process), State of Maryland v.
Washington (evidence not authenticated
because an unknown person derived it by
an unknown process), State of New Jersey
v. Nieves (authentication not possible due
to a lack of timeline and without reliable
identification as to time, place, date,
individuals
and
activities)
and
Commonwealth v. Connolly (did not lay a
proper foundation for authentication
because it did not present evidence to
show the date, time, or location of the
video), the extraction process is vital to
proving the authenticity of the evidence.
Identifying basic procedures and
best practices for extracting the DME will
provide the member sufficient guidance
Figure H. SWGDE Workflow Example
to get the job done and allow them the
flexibility to deal with any issue that may
arise during the process. Members should have already received training to have the skills and
techniques, and knowledge of processes that have been identified from best practices to
effectively extract the evidence (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging
Technology, 2010). A flow chart may be helpful in the SOP to allow members that do not have
as much training as technicians to complete basic extraction methods when situations do not
allow more trained personnel to do the extraction. A flowchart provides a visual aid providing
members easy-to-follow procedure. (See Figure H.)
All departments contained Chain of Custody information within their SOP system, either
in their DME SOP or in their general evidence handling SOPs. Department A had an audit trail
section within their retrieval documentation form to document chain of custody. Department
B’s evidence storage system also contained an audit trail and logged user actions to help maintain
the integrity of the video. US v. Taylor and Hicks (chain of possession), US v. Gallego (court does
not have to produce all witnesses who were in a position to come into contact with evidence),
People v. Taylor (showing the manner the recording was preserved), State of Maryland v.
Washington (lack of testimony to chain of custody), and State of New Jersey v. Nieves
(authentication not possible without explicitly eliciting a chain of custody) demonstrate the
importance of establishing and documenting Chain of Custody.
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Department B’s SOP also assigned a hash value to all DME. Department B is creating the digital
chain of custody by assigning a hash value that will help with any future challenges to
authentication and integrity. The courts have recognized the accuracy and reliability of using
Hash values in cases such as Glassgow, Mikenvich, and Wellman. Furthermore, SWGDE (2019)
identifies the importance of integrity verification for maintaining chain of custody and
recommends hashes be made as early as possible in the collection of evidence. By creating the
hash value and starting the chain of custody, departments can verify any copies of the evidence
and identify any changes made to the evidence.
Digital Multimedia Evidence - Documentation
Documentation is a crucial component to proper DME handling and recovery.
Documentation connects all the other phases and processes and is essential for providing details
that may be needed in the future. Good documentation in the form of field notes is also an
integral part of completing any final reporting procedures. The SOPs that received the highest
scores in the evaluations all provided a documentation form within the SOP. The documentation
forms contained important information such as time offset, DVR make/model and serial number,
number of cameras, retention time, general notes, and audit trail information. This aligns with
the suggested items to be documented from SWGDE (Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence, 2018) and OSAC (Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science,
2020). Descriptive field notes allow for easier final report writing. The author has had to write
numerous final reports where he relied on extensive field notes to complete the final report.
Some reports consisted of multiple locations of recovery with DME produced from various
sources. The ability to refer to well-documented field notes and also utilize pictures of the
systems was beneficial. Most SOPs that were evaluated did not have specific final reporting
procedures but mostly identified the need to document the facts of the case. Final reporting
procedures may be covered in more detail in unit-specific SOPs so the author was not surprised
to see very little information concerning final reporting.
Finally, when it came to the evidence disposition section of the Documentation phase,
the highest-rated SOPs contained detailed policy on the responsibilities of evidence disposition.
Department B’s SOP identified a digital evidence custodian responsible for retaining, auditing,
and purging the evidence. The SOP also identified the need to ensure all pertinent and viable
evidence is adequately safeguarded. The other departments all had general evidence SOPs that
discussed evidence disposition along with chain of custody. Due to the unique nature of digital
multimedia evidence, such as the different ways it can be stored: optical disc, USB, hard drives,
or cloud service, as well as issues such as the ability to access the evidence, it will be necessary
for departments to have strong DME policies in evidence disposition and storage. SWGDE (2020,
p.6) provides a summary of best practices for archiving DME:
1. Define in policy what data the organization requires to be archived for how long it must
be retained
2. Have a system to keep track of what is in the archive, where it is stored, and for
validating its integrity
3. Choose storage that appropriately meets the organization’s needs
4. Have redundancy, preferably geographically dispersed
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5. Have policy, plans, and procedures for:
a. Identifying personnel responsible for managing the archive
b. Adding data to the archive
c. Retrieving data from the archive
d. Ensuring archived content will be accessible when needed for full retention period
e. Removing data from the archive when no longer needed
One of the limitations of this report was the inability to access every SOP or policy manual
from the departments evaluated. Only SOPs accessible through the internet, which didn’t require
any permission or special clearance, were used. It is understandable if departments do not want
to make all investigative SOPs publicly available. Departments should consider identifying in their
general SOPs where members can find all pertinent procedure information within department
resources. During the evaluations, the author could not access specific procedures and forms
because the hyperlink directed the author to a department login web. This would provide
members direct access to material and would also ensure security for the materials.
Other Considerations
Following SWGDE, LEVA, government reports, and other industry leaders for best
practices provides detailed guidance for handling DME. It is advisable to follow these guidelines;
however, law enforcement personnel will have to balance the need to follow best practices and
outside factors that are situationally dependent. Every case and every location where DME may
be recovered is different. The members handling DME will have to balance the need to follow
best practices along with the needs of home and business owners who may be providing access
to their systems. Not every home or business owner will understand DME best practices and the
actions taken by law enforcement personnel. It may appear to them that law enforcement
personnel are damaging or changing their system in the process of recovery. They may not like
their system info and/or personal info being documented and possibly photographed.
Business owners have to balance the need to run a business as well as assist law
enforcement. The author has recovered DME in numerous businesses where the recording
system was behind the counter or in public view of the customers. Anyone in the store could
observe the author or any other law enforcement personnel while they were in the process of
extracting DME. To avoid this, members can close the store or prevent access to certain areas of
the store. But this may cause the business to lose customers or draw more attention to the
store’s assistance with law enforcement. Law enforcement personnel need to balance the need
of the business owners with procedures for handling DME. In certain high crime areas, the
business owners are more than willing to assist with law enforcement and balance the perception
of helping the police from the community. Some businesses keep their video systems in the
ceiling or other hard-to-reach areas to deter any equipment tampering. Sometimes the video
systems are located in an office with other computer equipment or merchandise on top of it.
Personnel should always attempt to leave the systems in the exact condition they found it.
Therefore, it may be hard to take pictures of the information on the box without risking the
possibility of moving and damaging equipment. The more extended law enforcement personnel
are in a business, the longer they may be drawing attention to that business.
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Similarly, homeowners may be worried about retribution from gangs or criminals for
helping law enforcement. This may cause them to be hesitant to provide personal information
or allow access to their system. The author has experienced situations where the offender(s)
have lived on the block or next door to locations with video cameras. The author has had to
recover DME from buildings where possible offenders were residing. Homeowners have
requested the author come at certain times and take a particular path to get to the house. Proper
preparation can sometimes alleviate some of these issues. Knowing what evidence is needed,
such as date and time of occurrence and camera angles or numbers of cameras, can expedite the
extraction process. Contacting businesses or homeowners if their information is known
beforehand will provide them the opportunity to help when it is convenient for them. This also
avoids wasting the members' time by heading to a location to discover they cannot get access to
a system. The goal should be for law enforcement personnel to work with home and business
owners on recovery procedures to maintain a positive relationship, so they continue to assist in
future investigations.
Caseload may be another factor that affects the ability of members to collect, extract or
analyze DME. Most departments evaluated in this report came from medium to large size
departments from urban areas. Departments in large metropolitan areas with high crime rates
will have different caseloads than small rural departments with low crime rates. Staffing and the
number of members either trained or tasked with handling DME will vary from department to
department. A department with a small amount of trained personnel that serves an area with
high crime rates may have a different caseload than the smaller rural department with the same
number of trained personnel. This is why it is important to have easily accessible and
understandable SOPs to help when personnel that may not have a lot of training or experience
with DME are given the task due to various situations. It is another reason why the SOPs should
be “sufficiently detailed but not be so rigid as to not allow for flexibility” per LEVA (Law
Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association, n.d., p. 4).
The author works in a large urban department in an area with high crime rates. The
author's location will often have nights when multiple homicides require a response. The
members in the author’s unit have to balance the need to respond to these crime scenes with
the existing follow-up work for other homicide and violent crime cases. The author’s unit may
have to triage the amount of work due to caseload and staffing. We may not be able to recover
DME and complete a full report all in one shift. A homicide investigation may contain numerous
locations or multiple crime scenes that may take weeks to follow up. Various forms of DME may
need to be recovered and compiled, such as surveillance video, Body Worn Cameras, red
light/speed cameras, and third-party videos such as YouTube or video posted on social media.
These situations present different challenges than responding to a burglary scene with a twocamera video system in a rural area. On the other hand, where the author has numerous
members in his unit, there are officers in rural departments who are the only individual tasked
with handling DME in either the entire town, city, county, or region. Allowing flexibility in SOPs
will enable members to follow best practices and make decisions that best handle each case's
different scenarios.
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This report only looked at department SOPs concerning general handling of DME but did
not go into the numerous types of DME or the nuances of handling each type. When creating or
updating SOPs, it will be beneficial to consider all kinds of video recording systems and video
sources in the world today. With the explosion in the use of social media, platforms such as
Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube can provide information of evidentiary value. Newer
surveillance systems targeting homeowners that utilize cloud technology have also seen a
dramatic increase. Cloud-based systems such as Ring are providing homeowners with the ability
to share video directly with law enforcement through email, text, or their applications like the
Ring Neighbors App.
Additionally, SOPs should address other areas where DME can be obtained and provide
material of evidentiary value. Red-light cameras, speed cameras, ATM cameras, and cellphone
cameras all can capture evidence. These methods of capturing video must be addressed along
with traditional forms such as DVRs.
One of the significant obstacles in properly handling DME within police departments
comes down to money. It costs a lot of money to receive training, procure equipment, and keep
up with all of the technological advances. It may be necessary for departments to obtain outside
funding to help with all the costs associated with adequately handling DME if they do not already
have systems in place. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends pooling
resources such as joining federal task forces and creating regional computer forensic labs or
fusion centers to help smaller or rural departments that may not have the resources available to
them (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018).

51
RECOMMENDATIONS

After reviewing the literature and evaluating the various departments’ SOPs, the author
offers the following recommendations to assist police departments in establishing best practices
for the acquisition and handling of digital multimedia evidence in their SOPs. It is the author’s
recommendation to have a stand-alone SOP to deal specifically with digital evidence or DME;
however, these recommendations should be taken into consideration for a stand-alone SOP or a
specific DME section within another SOP.
Recommendation #1: Establish a training protocol to teach and maintain DME best practices
To keep up with the constantly changing world of technology, law enforcement personnel
must understand the various technologies they will be working on. This begins with training and
continues while working with DME to stay on top of the latest techniques and tools. The training
should contain the categories identified by SWGDE’s (2010, p.5) recommendations for personnel
who collect, preserve, analyze, and/or examine digital evidence:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Awareness
Skills and Techniques
Knowledge of Processes
Skills Development for Legal Proceedings (Witness Testimony & Forensic Results
Preparation)
Continuing Education
Specialized Applications and Technologies

By developing SOPs along these guidelines will help establish the competency of the
members working with DME. This will help satisfy any questions as to the skills and abilities of
the personnel handling DME. In cases where members may be called in as an expert witness,
proper training help satisfy the standards outlined in FRE 702. Being trained and the ability to
show certificates in current technologies will also help address any future Frye or Daubert
challenges that may be brought up. Certifications of training and knowledge in currently accepted
best practices by the member will go towards the admissibility of the evidence for either of these
challenges.
The SOP should also address any procedure for members who may want to request future
training. This may include attaching “request forms” for training, procedures for requesting
training and having a list of approved training vendors or providers. Department B identified
approved outside training vendors such as the International Association (IAI), LEVA, National
Technical Investigators Association (NATIA), and the FBI Forensic Audio, Video and Image Analysis
Unit (FAVIAU). In addition to these organizations, there are numerous others such as the
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL), run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
National Domestics Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC), the National White Collar
Crime Center (NW3C), the National Cyber Crime Conference and the National Computer
Forensics Institute (NCFI,) run by the United States Secret Service. For a list of searchable training
opportunities, departments can utilize The Law Enforcement Cyber Center, managed by the U.S.
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Bureau of Justice Assistance (International Association of Chiefs of Police, n.d.). In addition to
these organizations, private technology vendors also provide training and certificates in their
technology to handle DME.
The SOP should not need to address every training aspect of working with DME but should
be an available resource for any member who may have questions about DME training
procedures. Goodison et al. (2015) identified the need to expand training to all department
members and beyond the introductory level. This may avoid excess requests for evidence
recovery and increase efficiency, improve evidence preservation and help manage expectations
on how quickly evidence can be obtained. More formal training DME policy and procedure for
work in a forensic lab or unit specifically tasked with working with DME should contain more
detailed training SOPs. If we look at Department B’s digital evidence SOP as a guide, the SOP
identified an approved list for outside training vendors and identified who was responsible for
keeping up with policy and procedures to be current with best practices. It also identified
procedures for managing and recording any certifications/training received by members.
Recommendation #2: Provide easily accessible basic DME acquisition SOPs available to all
members of the department
Not every item of DME will have the ability to be recovered or handled by a member who
has been trained in the proper procedures in DME acquisition. Staffing, caseload, situational
circumstances may require members who have minimal to no training in DME to be responsible
to recover that evidence. It will be essential to have easy-to-follow general DME handling
procedures for situations when trained personnel cannot respond. This should allow for a first
responder who comes across evidence the ability to identify DME, document the essential
information relative to the DME, attempt an extraction of the DME, understand any urgency of
DME recovery such as retention time, as well as understanding the proper procedure for notifying
the follow-up units. Some important areas to address:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Retention time
DVR make, model, serial number
Number of cameras/camera angles
Date/time offset
Owner info
Usernames/passwords

Identifying important extraction information will benefit the untrained members and
assist them in getting information that will help responding follow-up personnel who have
training. For the author, it is vital to get the evidence while the opportunity is available instead
of waiting for follow-up personnel to make a recovery. Depending on circumstances, waiting
may result in the loss of the evidence through data retention issues or human interference
(deletion). Therefore, the SOP should provide basic procedures to allow for minimally trained
personnel to identify DME and attempt an extraction or make notification to extract. The
workflows provided in Appendix C provides a framework used as a template to help illustrate
basic extraction procedures.

53
One issue that connects training and extraction methods is equipment. Department
members should have the proper equipment to handle DME and be adequately trained in any
specialized equipment they use. For General SOP guidance, the SOP should address everyday
equipment needs for the extraction of DME. Items such as storage media (USB drives, optical
disks), felt tip markers, extra mouse and keyboard, flashlight, and a department-issued
smartphone to document DME equipment, could all be identified in SOPs. The SOP should also
specify how the equipment can be utilized to collect, extract, and preserve DME. For
departments, writing digital evidence unit-specific SOPs, more advanced equipment such as
laptops, extra connection cables, keyboards, and monitors may be addressed. Any unit tasked
with handling digital evidence will also require equipment for processing the digital
evidence/DME, such as specialized computers, monitors, software with licenses, and storage
solutions.
Recommendation #3: Provide documentation forms along with procedure for properly
documenting DME acquisition
Proper documentation is a vital component in the collection, extraction, and preservation
of DME. Documentation provides a record of the equipment the DME was extracted from, what
methods were used, inventory procedures, etc. Proper documentation can also help with issues
related to the ability to playback the video, chain of custody, and any future forensic analysis
performed on the recovered material. Good documentation can address any issues as to the
integrity or authentication of the video.
Documentation forms such as field notes or retrieval forms should be provided directly in
the SOP as either an attachment or through a hyperlink. This will allow members easy access to
forms and enable members to bring them into the field to utilize while working with DME. This
allows the member to document in real-time and provides a guide on what information should
be collected. The forms should contain all relevant information needed for extraction, such as
make and model, retention time, username and passwords, date/time offset, and any other
pertinent information deemed necessary by the department. These documentation forms will
also assist in any future final reporting required of members working with DME.
Properly documenting chain of custody and providing a hash value to any recovered DME
will speak to the integrity of the evidence. This is valuable in proving that a particular piece of
evidence is the original and has not been altered in any way. There are times when evidence
does need to be shortened, resized, or brightened for many reasons. Providing proper
documentation to any changes made to the original evidence to allow a third party the ability to
complete the same steps and get the same result will show the reliability of the data. Good
documentation can provide important information as to the authenticity of the evidence. By
documenting specific aspects of the acquisition like date/time offset, camera angles, and
including pictures of the camera views and device information, will help show the data is what it
purports to be. Utilizing hash values at the time of acquisition will help document the
authenticity of the evidence and keep the integrity intact.
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Recommendation #4: Secure funding to pay for training, equipment, and other operational
needs.
The recommendations made in this report will not be cheap to implement. Training and
equipment cost money. With municipalities tightening their budgets and other areas in the
police department competing for budget money, additional funding sources will be needed. For
example, LEVA’s website lists its level 1 training costs at $1,100.00 for law enforcement personnel
and $2,000.00 for private-sector employees (Law Enforcement & Emergency Services Video
Association Internation, Inc., n.d.). Some organizations provide free training, such as NCFI and
NW3C, but free training should not be the sole source.
Equipment is another significant expense with proper DME handling. Computer
equipment built to handle the high volume of data processing will be required, and laptops for
any fieldwork. Other equipment such as storage media, extra cables, monitors, keyboards, and
other previously mentioned equipment will have to be supplied to members. Licensing will for
any processing programs or equipment will also have to be accounted for. Members will also
have to receive training to use any of these processing programs. It is also advisable to have a
secure lab and workspace for members handling DME. This space will have to include features
such as internet connection and security features to ensure the integrity of the evidence.
Another option is to join partnerships with other agencies or tasks such as regional task forces to
lower costs.
Archiving evidence can also be costly. SWGDE recommends utilizing online servers for
large data volumes as well as third-party hosted storage. Online servers or networked storage
require hardware, maintenance, and electrical/climate control costs to become very expensive.
Hosted storage options have recently seen their prices reduced. However, the amount of
redundancy and speed, and frequency of retrieval will involve recurring costs that will increase
with the volume of the stored data (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2020).
Departments will also have to factor in these costs that may annually increase if the volume of
data continues to grow.
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CONCLUSION

The video of the death of George Floyd provided a powerful account of the incidents from
May in 2020. Along with the other available video from that night, the evidence against Derek
Chauvin was overwhelming. This case highlights the importance of identifying and recovering
video evidence from crime scenes. It can be such an essential part of the evidence that police
departments should be handling video or Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME) with techniques
and procedures with best practices that industry leaders recognize.
The constant changing of technology presents a challenge for the courts and legal system
to keep up. When the technology that produces the evidence is changing rapidly, how do
departments prepare their members for these changes? Having strong, flexible Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) helps address the change that is constantly occurring with
technology. This study identified several important areas in collecting and handling DME by
evaluating industry best practices along with current legal guidelines. Several recommendations
were made to guide police departments in developing SOPs to address those issues. While the
recommendations are a beginning to the proper handling of DME, the author feels further
research is needed to keep up with the constantly evolving world of technology.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Evaluation Rubrics
Methodology Form: _______________________
TRAINING Phase
Outside Training

Internal Training

Continuing
Education

Equipment

Notes:
Other Observations:
Score:
Total Score:

PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

Notes:
Other Observations:
Score:
Total Score:

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes
Notes:
Other
Observations
Score:
Total Score:

Final Score: __________

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition
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Methodology Form: ___Department F_____________

Training Phase

Outside Training
Notes:

Other Observations:
Score:

Internal Training

Continuing Education

Equipment

-Have a training SOP
-Training SOP also
-Training SOP (nothing
that defines outside or
identifies internal training specific to DME)
external training
-nothing specific to DME
-defines “Roll Call” and
-identifies request
“In-Service” Training
procedure outside
training
-nothing specific to
DME
-Training SOP is detailed but generic, no specific mention of DME

-nothing specific in
SOPs in relation to
DME

3

1

3

3

Total Score:
10

PROCESS Phase

Notes:

Other Observations:

Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

-Nothing DME specific in
SOPs

-Nothing in SOPs about DME

1

1

Chain of Custody

Very good detailed description of
Chain of Custody in SOP but
nothing specific for DME
-SOP about Crime Scene Investigation discusses developing an investigative plan, outlining specific
responsibilities for processing crime scene but nothing DME specific

Score:
3

Total Score:
5

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

Notes:

-nothing about field notes and
nothing specific to DME

-SOP identifies need to list
evidence
-identifies what should be in
report but nothing specific to
DME

-General evidence SOP but
nothing specific to DME
-detailed description of Chain of
Custody

Other
Observations

-Crime Scene Investigation APD.SOP .3081 has an entire section about Photographs and Videotape
Information but it only discusses photo/video taken by APD personnel of crime scenes
-should add hyperlinks to forms

Score:
1
Total Score:
6

Final Score: ___21_______

2

3
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Methodology Form: ___Department A_____________

TRAINING Phase

Outside Training

Internal Training

Continuing Education

Equipment

Notes:

-Entire SOP on
requesting outside
training
-includes forms for
requests
-not DME specific

-Whole SOP on inservice training
-not DME specific

-SOP states members
should receive at least
40 hrs of training yearly

-Dept issues DIVRT
kits to members
-kit includes a large
amount of equipment
-also have stand-alone
laptops
-DIVRT kit inventory
form

Other Observations:

-DIVRT (Digital Video Evidence Recovery) Kit
-Also have a LawMate PVR (Personal Video Recorder) to obtain DME

Score:
Total Score:

4
15

3

3

5

PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

Notes:

-a few preparation steps
-mostly deals with getting
DIVRT kits ready
-SOP dealing with the
management of Criminal
Investigations is outdated
(1987)

-Documentation form identifies
Make, Model, # of cameras, DVR
offset which is consistent with best
practices
-No written process in policy

-have a “Audit Trail” section in
the Retrieval Documentation
Form

Other Observations:
Score:

-SOP provides officers with location of forms to request video
3

4

4

Total Score:
11

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes
Notes:

Other
Observations

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

-DIVRT SOP provides officers
with the Retrieval
Documentation Form
-very descriptive, 4 pages
-also a PD81 form, Property
Record Form

-SOP identifies process of
-DIVRT SOP directs reader to
uploading video and how to
Evidence SOP for proper
document
inventory procedures
-Identifies a “Crime Scene
-General Evidence SOP, nothing
Examination Case File” that
else specific to DME
would have all relevant reports
included
-No specific mention of DME
-A lot of information across numerous SOPs, would be nice to have DME pertinent information located
in one SOP.

Score:
5
Total Score:
13

Final Score: ___39_______

4

4
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Methodology Form: ___Department C_____________

TRAINING Phase

Notes:

Other Observations:

Outside Training

Internal Training

Continuing Education

-Have a training SOP that
defines outside or external
training
-identifies dept form to
request outside training
-nothing specific to DME

-Training SOP also
identifies internal training
-nothing specific to DME

-Training SOP (nothing
specific to DME)
-defines “Roll Call
Training”

3

3

3

Equipment

-nothing specific in SOPs
in relation to DME
-Recovering Digital
Media Evidence SOP
discusses Criminal
Analysis Unit (CAU)
having ability to convert
video, must have some
equipment/programs
-Recovering Digital Media Evidence SOP states CAU members who have been trained are allowed to convert. Only
mention of DME/training together in SOPs

Score:
2

Total Score:
11

PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

Notes:

-SOP outlines role of Investigator
to provide info to recovery
personnel
-SOP identifies need to provide
date, time, location of DME
recovery
-SOPs cover general crime
scene/investigator
responsibilities, nothing DME
specific

-SOP identifies the need to recover
DME per training and best practices
-nothing specific to what training is or
best practices

-SOP covers general Chain of
Custody procedures
-nothing specific to DME

Other Observations:

-HPD has an entire SOP called “Recovering Digital Media Evidence” (SOP 1.17)
-not as thorough for being an entire SOP specific to DME, could add more info
-Have a Crime Analysis Unit but unable to locate SOP or info about it
-Have a SOP 8.13-Handling of Evidence but unable to gain access
3
3
3

Score:
Total Score:

9

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes
Notes:

Other
Observations
Score:

Evidence Disposition

-SOP identifies Digital Multimedia -SOP identifies need for
-General evidence SOP but
Evidence Recovery Form HPDdocumenting recovery of DME in
nothing specific to DME
503
police report but not specific
-unable to access
-should add hyperlinks directly to
SOPs for forms
-Does identify “Crime Analysis Request Form” HPD-107B and Computer & Digital Forensic Report SOP 8.18
but unable to access, should add hyperlinks to forms
4

Total Score:
9

Final Score: ___29_______

Final Reports

3

2
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Methodology Form: ___Department B_____________

TRAINING Phase

Outside Training

Internal Training

Continuing Education

Equipment

Notes:

-Identifies outside agencies
approved for training in
DME

-Digital Evidence SOP
repeatedly mentions training
-identifies that some training
will be done through interdepartmental channels

-SOP identifies the
importance of keep up with
technology with changes at
a rapid pace

-SOP mentions “PPD
issued tools and equipment”
in regard to recovering
DME but does not list
specific equipment

Other Observations:

-SOP identifies DME as possible evidence at crime scene
-SOP identifies procedure for managing and recording certifications and training related to DME
-SOP identifies responsibility of Office of Forensic Science (OFS) to keep policies and procedures up to date and compliant
with current best practices
-Ensures will keep an “Approved Training List”
-SOP mentions DIVRT technicians and FVA’s but does not mention specific training or equipment they may have

Score:
Total Score:

5
18

5

5

3

PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

Notes:

-SOP identifies need for legal
authority before recovering DME
-identifies procedure for
“responding personnel” to canvas
crime scene for Digital Evidence
and look specially for digital
surveillance systems
-identifies only trained personnel are
authorized to recover DME
-has entire section titled (Preparing
to Recover Digital Evidence)

-entire section titled “Recovery of Digital
Evidence”
-section geared a little more towards
computers but a lot of crossover with
DME
-identifies need to photograph DME
equipment
-identifies need to recover using best
practices and in native format if possible

-All digital evidence is stored in their
Digital Evidence Management System
(DEMS)
-DEMS is secure storage with its own
SOP
-authorized access only
-all user actions logged and
periodically audited
-audit trail for chain of custody
-all digital evidence receives a hash
value

Other Observations:

-SOP identifies outside agencies that may be helpful in assisting in recovery or examination of digital evidence
-SOP identifies methods for requesting further examination of DME by OFS and OFS responsibilities

Score:
5

4

5

Total Score:
14

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes
Notes:

Other
Observations
Score:
Total Score:

Final Score: ___45_______

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

-SOP identifies a DE Recovery
-SOP does not specifically mention
Form, 75-665
final reporting
-attaches a copy of form to SOP
-recovery forms and SOP section
-provides a process for filling it out
covering recovery form identifies
-specific section on surveillance
important information need to be
video
notated
-Have a DE Recovery Form (Digital
Video), 75-656 that identifies DVR
make, model, offset, # of cameras,
retention time, notes, etc
-would be nice to have a hyperlink to DEMS

-SOP has an entire section titled
“Retention and Purging”
-identifies a “Digital Evidence
Custodian”
-identifies periodic audits and
reviews
-identifies need to ensure pertinent
and viable evidence is safeguarded

5
13

5

3
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Methodology Form: ___Department D_____________

TRAINING Phase

Outside Training
Notes:

Other Observations:

Internal Training

Continuing Education

Equipment

-Have a SAPD “Training
-SAPD Training
-nothing specific in
Academy” that is online
Academy online
SOPs in relation to
through SAPD web
-SOP identifies 40hrs of
DME
-appears to be a good
training to be done
resource for additional
yearly for officers
training
-Nothing specific to
-Nothing specific to
DME
DME
-SOPs do have small paragraphs that define “Specialized Training” and “Career Development” but nothing
specific to training and DME
-SAPD has a “Career Development Program” offered through to dept to officers. Access through SAPD web
portal (unable to access)
-SOPs allows for
officers to apply for
outside training
-No SOPs in relation to
outside training and
DME.

Score:
3

3

3

1

Total Score:
10

PROCESS Phase
Preparation Steps
Notes:

Other Observations:

Score:

Method of Extraction

Chain of Custody

-SOPs identify actions for
officers in “Crime Scene
Duties” SOP.
-very narrow duties

-SOP gives process for handling
-SOPs cover general procedures
some DME but appears to be more
for documenting chain of custody
geared towards VHS
-identifies basic chain of custody
-not very specific
procedures
-seems outdated
-nothing specific for DME
-have an entire section titled: “Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings are Made”
-entire section seems out of date, numerous mentions of VHS
-needs to be updated
3
2
3

Total Score:
8

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

Notes:

-Have numerous forms listed but
unable to access
-all processes of documenting
are generic, no DME

-entire SOP about reporting:
offense/incident/ supplemental
-nothing specific to DME
-identifies where reports can be
found but unable to access

-Describes a “Videotape
Receptacle in Headquarters
Building where final master
copy is to be dropped off
-all other SOPs are generic to
evidence handling, nothing
DME specific

Other
Observations
Score:

-evidence disposition seems out of date with “Videotape Receptacle”
-might need to update along with updating verbiage
3

Total Score:
9

Final Score: ___27_______

3

3
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Methodology Form: ___Department E_____________
TRAINING Phase

Outside Training
Notes:

Other Observations:

Internal Training

Continuing Education

Equipment

-Have a training SOP
-Training SOP also
-Training SOP (nothing
-SOPs identify
that encourages further
identifies In-service
specific to DME)
smartphones for taking
training
training as standard
pics and media cards but
-states officers
straining
used to document crime
SHOULD be provided
-classes provided to
scenes
with 30hrs of training a
update training
-nothing specific to
year
-nothing specific to DME
DME
-nothing specific to
DME
-SOP titled Photographic Evidence 7.090 states employees will receive training but it is only in regard to dept.
DSLR cameras to document crime scene
-also provided with image processing software for documenting crime scene but nothing specific to DME

Score:
1

1

1

2

Total Score:
5

PROCESS Phase

Notes:

Other Observations:

Preparation Steps

Method of Extraction

-Nothing DME specific in
SOPs
-minor description of drop-off
procedure of computers to
Forensic Lab, not DME related

-SOP has a good process description
for submitting photos for evidence,
not DME related

1

1

Chain of Custody

-SOP provides info about
documenting chain of custody but
not DME related
-Washington State Patrol Forensic
Services Guide has paragraph
detailing chain of custody but not
DME related
-Washington State Patrol Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau has a “High Tech Crimes Unit” but only
specifically mentions Cell Phones
-WSP Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau also does processing of Firearms, DNA, prints, etc but no mention
of DME

Score:
3

Total Score:
5

DOCUMENTATION Phase
Field Notes

Final Reports

Evidence Disposition

Notes:

-only mention is a “Canvass
Card” for documenting witness
information

-only mention is that Case Files
should satisfy standards set forth
by States Attorney office and
published by Criminal
Investigations Bureau

-General evidence SOP but
nothing specific to DME
-detailed description of dealing
with photos produced for
documenting crime scene

Other
Observations

-SPD has a very detailed SOP titled Photographic Evidence but it only deals with photographic evidence
produced from SPD members documenting crime scenes. Could easily add DME information to this
SOP

Score:
1
Total Score:
5

Final Score: ___15______

1

3
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Appendix B – Documentation Form Examples
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Department B Recovery Forms
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Department A Retrieval Documentation Forms

72

73

74
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Department A Equipment List
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Appendix C – Workflow Examples
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